2017-Iran’s Azerbaijan Question
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Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution 55
instructed by Iranian operatives to assassinate Gaby Ashkenazi, chief of the Israeli defense forces, who was expected to visit the Azerbaijani capital in a few months. 122
Aviv, with Azerbaijan, as one Israeli intelligence agent put it, becoming a “ground zero for Israeli intelligence work. Our presence here is quiet, but substantial. We have increased our presence in the past year, and it gets us very close to Iran. This is a wonderfully porous country.” 123 In addition, in early 2012, Azerbaijani authorities arrested 22 Azerbaijani citizens and accused them of spying for Iran, a move that soon led to a parallel reaction from Iran. In mid-2012, Iranian media reported they had interrogated and were holding two Azerbaijan nationals on charges of espionage. According to the Iranian media, using the cover of cultural activities, Azerbaijani nationals traveled to Iran‘s Azerbaijani-majority provinces to recruit Iranians – in fact, ethnic Azerbaijanis – to promote separatism. 124 In the
midst of heated debates in the West over the necessity to strike at Iran over its nuclear program, what appeared to be Azerbaijan‘s flirtation with Israel and the United States over providing its soil to intelligence operations made Iranian officials nervous. At the peak of the crisis, Azerbaijani parliamentarians suggested changing the name of their country to Northern Azerbaijan, reviving Tehran‘s paranoia of Baku seeking – possibly in tandem with Iran‘s age-old enemies – to disintegrate the Islamic Republic from within. 125
The crisis took on a financial dimension following the stiffening of Western sanctions against Iran that took place over this period. In fact, for the internationally isolated Iran, Azerbaijan had represented an important trade partner and an intermediary for access to Western and global markets. After Iran was cut off from the worldwide electronic banking system, SWIFT, in early 2012, the importance of the Azerbaijani banking system became fully apparent. Until then, Azerbaijan had been serving as an important site for carrying out international banking operations that could not be conducted in the Islamic Republic, and for conducting international trade in general. Yet in
122 Emil Souleimanov, “Is Azerbaijan Becoming an Area of Confrontation between Iran and Israel?” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, February 8, 2012, http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5711. 123
Elad Benari, “Azerbaijan Considering Helping Israel in Iran,“ Israel National News, September 30, 2012, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/160429#.V0785ksgdbg. 124 “Iran Questioning Azerbaijani Nationals on Espionage Charges,“ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 4, 2012, http://www.rferl.org/content/iran-report-says-two-azerbaijan-nationals-questioned-espionage- charges/24634989.html. 125 Joshua Keating, “Azerbaijan to Change Name to ‘Northern Azerbaijan’ to Annoy Iran?“, Foreign Policy, February 2, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/02/azerbaijan-to-change-name-to-northern-azerbaijan-to- annoy-iran/. Souleimanov & Kraus
56 2012, triggered by the mounting crisis between the two neighboring states, the Central Bank of Azerbaijan (CBA) deprived Royal Bank, owned in large part by Ali Jam, an American citizen of Iranian origin, of its license to conduct banking activities in Azerbaijan. 126 In addition, the CBA effectively halted all of Royal Bank’s transactions, as well as activities carried out on behalf of Iranian businessmen, who were accused of money laundering. A number of Iranian businessmen were deported – and the flow of funds from Iran into Azerbaijan restricted. The bank finally had its license revoked by the CBA. 127 Similarly, companies and businesses on Azerbaijani territory owned by Iranians were closed and their assets were transferred from Iranian to Azerbaijani control. This happened, for instance, with one of Baku’s largest and most important hotels – Hotel Europa, which had been owned by Iranian businessmen. The hotel was transferred to Azerbaijani owners, and many employees of Iranian origin were dismissed. Back then, despite its formal distancing from the Western-Iranian standoff, Azerbaijan tended to side with the West in financial terms. By and large, in comparison to the 1990s and early 2000s, the government in Tehran tends to take Azerbaijani statehood more seriously today. 128 This is caused mainly by the growing economic power of post-Soviet Azerbaijan along with its increasing military and diplomatic strength, cemented by its established relations with key Western nations in the field of oil and natural gas exports. Importantly, since 2014 and especially since 2015, there has been a substantial warming of Iranian- Azerbaijani relations as both countries, are hungry for foreign investment and increased regional cooperation, following the striking of the nuclear deal with Iran in early 2015 and the global fall of oil prices,. As Fariz Ismailzade has summarized, with oil prices “hit[ting] low levels, Azerbaijan and Iran are looking for ways to develop their non-oil economy, integrate regional transport networks and boost mutually advantageous business projects. In that respect, thorny political issues
126
Common knowledge had it that Royal Bank was involved in money laundering for Iranian citizens and it may ties to Tehran. 127 “Central Bank of Azerbaijan annulled the license of Royal Bank,” Contact.az, June 13, 2012., http://www.contact.az/docs/2012/Economics&Finance/071300005337en.htm#.V2ftg2iLSHs 128
Interviews by Josef Kraus with representatives of Azerbaijani and Iranian political circles, whose names are withheld at their request. Yüklə 0,58 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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