Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution
61
Still, there is yet to be any evidence that Ankara has utilized the Iranian Azerbaijani
card in its relationship with Tehran. To the contrary; during the mass protests in
Iranian Azerbaijani cities in 2006 and 2011, Turkish media paid relatively little
attention to the events in the Islamic Republic, with Turkish authorities ignoring
the issue. Moreover, while Turkish (and Azerbaijani) society and some civic
organizations and political parties unequivocally expressed support for what they
considered to be the plight of their ethnic kin in Iran, the inaction of the authorities
led the editors of the pan-Turkic website run by Chehregani to lament over
brotherly Turkey’s "indifference toward the heroic uprising of Azeri Turks against
the bloody suppression in Iran."
137
As a matter of fact, Ankara has influence over the Azerbaijani minority in Iran, but
this influence is passive, i.e. untargeted and largely inadvertent through television
broadcasting, tourism, and immigrant workers.
138
Indeed, Turkish satellite
television represents the main channel of communication connecting Turkey, the
Republic of Azerbaijan, and Iran’s Azerbaijani-majority provinces. Turkish culture,
language, and mainstream political attitudes have been pouring into the majority
of Azerbaijani households, who perceive these as an alternative to official Tehran
broadcasts and as a model for their own cultural and political orientation.
Still, the ongoing war in Syria appears to have deepened ideological barriers
between parts of Iranian Azerbaijani population and the Turks. In fact, most
secular-minded Iranian Azerbaijanis have been indifferent to the religious
dimensions of the Syrian Civil War. But this segment of the Iranian Azerbaijani
population is confined to the urban centers, while most rural areas in Iranian
Azerbaijan and smaller towns are home to populations with a fairly strong Shiite
identity. The latter group is supportive of the Assad regime as fellow Shiites, and
Sunni Turkey is increasingly portrayed as a religious enemy. The situation is
exacerbated by the hundreds of young Iranian Azerbaijanis who volunteer in Syria
as part of Iran’s semi-official forces – of whom dozens have been killed or injured
in combat. Although our sample size is far from being representative, available
evidence suggests that the civil war in Syria has halted the advance of ethnic
137
Quoted in Nayereh Tohidi, Iran: Regionalism, Ethnicity and Democracy, Open Democracy Working Paper,
June 29, 2006,
http://ejournal.narotama.ac.id/files/Iran%20regionalism,%20ethnicity%20and%20democracy.pdf.
138
In 2011, 2.7 million Iranian tourists are said to have visited Turkey. Anthony H. Cordesman, “U.S. and
Iranian Strategic Competition: Turkey and the South Caucasus,“
Center for Strategic Studies & International
Studies, June (2013): 30, http://csis.org/files/publication/130612_turk_casp_chap9.pdf.
Souleimanov & Kraus
62
nationalism – a phenomenon that had been gaining momentum since the Urmia
protests of 2011 – in Iran’s Azerbaijani-majority areas. Perhaps even more
importantly, the Syrian Civil War has deepened divisions between nationalist
secular Azerbaijanis on the one hand, and socially conservative and religiously-
minded Azerbaijanis in Iran itself on the other.
139
This having been said, Ankara may have additional reasons not to play the Iranian
Azerbaijani card, at least not in cooperation with Baku. Turkey maintains
significant influence on post-Soviet Azerbaijan as it is Azerbaijan's closest and most
important strategic partner. But so far, in an attempt to avoid armed confrontation
with Russia’s key ally in the South Caucasus, Armenia, Turkey has been unwilling
and unable to help Baku find an effective solution to its conflict with Armenia or
to provide Azerbaijan with security guarantees.
140
Although Ankara’s assistance in
the regional isolation of Armenia has proven crucial to Baku – and Ankara has
functioned as Baku’s most important partner on the international scene – Turkey
has avoided entering a formal alliance with Azerbaijan. If Ankara and Baku are to
make use of the Iranian Azerbaijani card – and Baku is to face the consequences of
this play – Turkey is unlikely to provide tangible support to Azerbaijan. This may
further reduce Baku’s willingness to engage in covert activities in Iranian
Azerbaijan. From Ankara’s perspective there is the potential of Iranian interference
into Turkey’s dealings with Kurds. For instance, in 2016 there have been reported
meetings of representatives of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, led by
Gen. Qasem Soleimani with senior PKK members in Baghdad and in Halabja and
Rania in Iraqi Kurdistan.The internal divisions between Kurdish groups continue
to make headlines, but it is clear that they are still able to influence the behavior
and decisions of both Iran and Turkey. So far, the two countries have managed to
keep their proxy war over northern Syria and Iraq contained, avoiding allowing it
to lead to direct confrontation between them.
141
There is an additional economic reason why Ankara would seek to avoid playing
the Iranian Azerbaijani card. Following the warming of Iran’s relations with the
West, natural gas exports from Iran headed for European markets would
139
Numerous interviews by Emil Souleimanov with Iranian Azerbaijanis based in Europe and of Josef
Kraus with Iranian Azerbaijanis based in Tabriz and Urumieh.
140
On the fundamentals of Turkey‘s Azerbaijan policy, see, for instance, Svante Cornell, "Turkey and the
Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Delicate Balance,"
Middle Eastern Studies 34, no. 1 (1998): 51-72.
141
Pinar Tremblay. "Iranian-Turkish tug-of-war over Kurds, Al-Monitor“,
Al-Monitor, December 13, 2016.
(http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/12/turkey-iran-become-latest-surrogate-of-pkk.html)