Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution
63
necessarily have to pass through Iranian Azerbaijan.
142
Transport infrastructure,
both extent and under construction, reflects this reality. Any threats to this
infrastructure would necessarily mean a threat to the economic interests and even
to the energy security of Turkey. Although Ankara views the emancipation efforts
of the ethnically closely related Azerbaijani minority in Iran in a positive light,
Turkey’s economic interests act as a powerful counterweight. Emerging
interdependence thus creates stability between the two regional powers.
143
The
ambivalence between the country’s real economic interests on the one hand and
the power rivalry between the two powers are likely to lead Ankara’s policy on
Iranian Azerbaijan to remain largely passive.
The United States
Relations between the United States and Iran have been complicated ever since the
so-called Islamic Revolution in 1979, when Tehran transformed itself from one of
Washington’s key allies into its archenemy virtually overnight. Over the long term,
America’s position with respect to the Islamic Republic has been overtly
antagonistic, and since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, Iran has
become America’s chief adversary in the region. However, American interests tend
to concentrate more on the Persian Gulf than on the Caspian Sea. This is primarily
due to historical circumstances and the closer ties to Saudi Arabia.
America’s relations with this region are thus at a crossroads of policy regarding the
Caucasus and policy towards Iran. The U.S.A customarily identifies three areas of
interest in the Caucasus – security and stability, democratization and human rights,
and energy and trade. The U.S.A, meanwhile, has enforced harsh trade sanctions
against Iran and its energy industry sector since 1995 with the aim of trying to limit
Iran's participation in any energy projects in the Caspian Sea and elsewhere. For
example, in November 1994 Baku agreed to provide Iran’s National Iranian Oil
Company (NIOC) a five percent share in the Azerbaijan International Operating
Company (AIOC) developing Azerbaijan’s offshore oilfields. But already in April
1995, as a result primarily of American pressure, the NIOC was excluded from the
consortium. Richard Kauzlarich, then the American ambassador in Baku, stated
openly that without exclusion of the Iranian company from the consortium, the
142
A different version would to use the unstable territory of Iraq and of civil war torn Syria.
143
For more information about Turkey’s position as an energy hub, see Emil Souleimanov, Josef Kraus,
“Turkey: An Important East-West Energy Hub,” Middle East Policy 19, no. 2, Summer (2012): 157-168.
Souleimanov & Kraus
64
American firms with their strong 40 percent share would withdraw entirely. In
reaction, Iran immediately charged President Aliyev of Azerbaijan with being a
puppet of the “Great Satan.”
144
More recently, President George W. Bush famously ascribed Iran into the “axis of
evil” in 2002, a move that caused outrage in the Islamic Republic. According to
some observers, in order to weaken the Islamic Republic from within, during the
past two decades some Washington neo-conservatives have advocated for
supporting the political demands of Iran’s major ethnic minorities – such as Arabs,
Azerbaijanis, Baluchis, and Kurds.
145
In the Kurdish case, according to journalist
Seymour M. Hersh, there has been the U.S.A support for the Party for a Free Life
in Kurdistan (PJAK), a Kurdish organization fighting – both politically and
militarily – the Iranian government to obtain cultural and political rights and
acquire self-determination for Kurds in Iran.
146
According to Hersh, Americans and
Israelis provided PEJAK with equipment, training, and targeting intelligence.
Although data is missing on this controversial topic, off-record consultations with
American experts and diplomats reveal that back in the early 2000s, part of the U.S.
A neo-conservative establishment may have at least flirted with the idea of
supporting Azerbaijani separatism in Iran. Yet they apparently gave up on the idea,
having evaluated the weak popular base for Azerbaijani separatism in the Islamic
Republic.
147
Most recently, Dana Rohrabacher, a Republican member of Congress
from California, introduced a resolution in September 2012 calling for the self-
determination of the Azerbaijani people who are "currently divided between the
Republic of Azerbaijan and the Islamic Republic of Iran." Although the resolution
failed, some Azerbaijani nationalists in Baku and a few leaders of the Iranian-
Azerbaijani diaspora greeted this initiative as an important milestone for their
cause. Personalities like Rohrabacher represented an idea, popular in some circles,
that any means short of an outright military attack should be used to weaken Iran
from within in order to pave the way for regime change.
148
144
Emil Souleimanov and Ondrej Ditrych, “Iran and Azerbaijan: A Contested Neighborhood,” Middle East
Policy 14, no. 2, 2007.
145
Nayereh Tohidi. Iran: regionalism, ethnicity and democracy.
OpenDemocracy, 2006. Available at:
http://ejournal.narotama.ac.id/files/Iran%20regionalism,%20ethnicity%20and%20democracy.pdf
146
Seymour M. Hersh, “The next act. Is a damaged administration less likely to attack Iran, or more?”, The
New Yorker, November 27, 2006, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/11/27/the-next-act.
147
Discussions by Emil Souleimanov with US experts and diplomats in Washington, 2007 and 2014.
148
Eldar Mamedov. “Azerbaijan: American Neo-Con Meddling Threatens to Bring Balkan-Style Mess to
Iran.” Eurasianet.org, November 1, 2012, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66134.