2017-Iran’s Azerbaijan Question
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Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution 65
Israel Formerly a strategic partner of the Iranian monarchy, Israel turned into Iran’s archenemy in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution. Since then, Iranian-Israeli relations have been tense, with Iran’s ambitious nuclear program – and Tehran’s frequent calls to wipe the Jewish State off the face of the Earth – being at the core of the two countries’ troubled relationship. 149 Moreover, Tehran’s support for extremist Shiite groups in south Lebanon, particularly Hezbollah, has been a major source of concern in Israel. 150
concentrated on its relations with Azerbaijan to further its interests in the region. Azerbaijani-Israeli relations have long been excellent in the fields of security, economic, and military cooperation. 151
Since the mid-2000s, Azerbaijan’s increasingly close cooperation with Israel – including Baku’s massive purchases of sophisticated weapons from Israel and intelligence cooperation – have spurred speculation that Azerbaijani territory could be used for an Israeli attack on the Islamic Republic. 152
However, as most observers have agreed, Baku is very unlikely to consent to granting its territory for the purposes of attacking its southern neighbor as doing so would subject the country to considerable risk from an Iranian military strike. Another important Israeli interest is the import of oil from Azerbaijan. A significant portion of the oil consumed by Israel – an estimated 40 percent – is imported from Azerbaijan. A subsidiary of SOCAR even took part in the oil drillings by Shemen Oil off the Ashdod coast within Israeli territory. The drilling has so far been unsuccessful, but is an important sign of Azerbaijan’s willingness to cooperate with Israel and invest in its energy sector. 153
149 For more on the evolution of the Iranian-Israeli relations, see Ray Takeyh, “Iran, Israel and the Politics of Terrorism,“ Survival 48, no. 4 (2006), 83-96. 150
Patrick Devenny, “Hezbollah's Strategic Threat to Israel,“ Middle East Quarterly 13, no. 1 (2006), 31-38. 151
Azerbaijani-Israeli ccoperation has symbolic limits, as well. Although an Israeli embassy exists in Baku, Azerbaijan has refrained from opening a diplomatic headquarters in Tel Aviv in order not to alienate fellow Muslim states, the support of which it has sought over the Nagorno-Karabagh issue, and, even most importantly, not to alienate Iran. 152 Mark Perry, “Israel's Secret Staging Ground,” Foreign Policy, March 28, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/28/israel_s_secret_staging_ground. 153
Gallia Lindenstrauss, “Israel-Azerbaijan: Despite the Constraints, a Special Relationship”, Strategic Assessment, Vol. 17, No. 4, January 2015. Souleimanov & Kraus
66 As previously mentioned, Azerbaijani authorities averted a terrorist attack on Jewish targets in 2012. Three men were arrested by the Azerbaijan Ministry of National Security, after planning to attack two Israelis employed by a Jewish school in Baku. They received smuggled arms and equipment from Iranian agents.154 Azerbaijani officials immediately blamed Iran’s secret services, which were accused of having masterminded, funded, and orchestrated the plot. At the same time, speculation surfaced that Israel’s intelligence service had assisted in preventing the attack. 155
announced the arrest of 22 persons accused of treason and conducting espionage for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Thus, Tehran appeared to view Azerbaijan as an important battleground in its secret war against the Israeli intelligence services.
As Israeli covert action against Iran has increased, the possible role of nationalist groups in Iranian Azerbaijan has risen on the agenda. Retired Brigadier General Oded Tira, for example, urged Israel to “coordinate with Azerbaijan the use of airbases in its territory and enlist the support of the Azeri minority in Iran.” 157
Israeli agencies have been credibly alleged to cooperate with the opposition Iranian Mujahedeen-e-Khalq 158
on spying operations, diversionary actions, and assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists. It would not be inconceivable for this established model of cooperation to be gradually passed on to increasingly radicalized minority groups, including Iranian Azerbaijanis. Yet no key structures for the Iranian nuclear program are located in Iranian Azerbaijani, and thus any targeting of Iranian Azerbaijani groups would be motivated mainly by a calculated
154
Eli Shvidler, “Azerbaijan Thwarts Terror Attack Against Israeli, Jewish Targets“, Haaretz, January 23, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/jewish/azerbaijan-thwarts-terror-attack-against-israeli-jewish-targets- 1.408705 155
Emil Souleimanov, “Is Azerbaijan Becoming Area of Confrontation Between Iran and Israel?” 156
Moniquet and Racimora, “The Armenia-Iran Relationship: Strategic Implication for Security in the South Caucasus Region,” 57. 157 “Israeli General Suggests to Use Azerbaijan’s airbases in Strike against Iran”, today.az, January 2, 2007. (http://www.today.az/news/politics/34565.html) 158
Mujahedeen-e Khalq, also known by the abbreviations MEK, MKO, or PMOI (People’s Mujahedin of Iran), is an organization that constitutes an important Iranian opposition group that often resorts even to terrorist methods. The MKO was most active in the early 1980s, when it carried out a series of assassinations against leading representatives of the new Iranian regime. The most significant terrorist act was a bomb attack in 1981 at the headquarters of the Party of the Islamic Republic, which resulted in the deaths of more than seventy highly placed officials of the new regime. Khomeini reacted with a massive wave of purges and repression that forced the MEK to flee into exile. Michael Rubin, “Monsters of the Left: The Mujahedin al- Khalq,” Middle East Forum, January 13, 2006, http://www.meforum.org/888/monsters-of-the-left-the- mujahedin-al-khalq.
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