2017-Iran’s Azerbaijan Question
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- Bu səhifədəki naviqasiya:
- Authors’ Bio Emil A. Souleimanov
- Josef Kraus
Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution 67
attempt to weaken the Islamic Republic’s power through internal disruption. However, given Azerbaijan’s vulnerability to Iran and Turkey’s willingness to keep a low profile in security issues surrounding Azerbaijan, any Azerbaijani or Turkish assistance would be difficult for Jerusalem to acquire. Due to the recent détente in Iranian-Azerbaijani relations, that assistance is even less likely today than it was a decade ago. Russia Post-Soviet Russia has held a special relationship with Iran. Since the mid-1990s, Russia has been an important supplier of advanced weapons to the Islamic Republic, at the same time becoming its key economic and strategic partner. In the post-Islamic Revolution period, Russia has also basically created the Iranian nuclear program. Russia shares Iran’s interests in the Caspian Sea region and has similar goals in the Persian Gulf. In the latter area, Moscow-backed energy companies have won lucrative contracts for the development of Iranian oil and gas fields. 159
Russia’s approach to Azerbaijan has been conditioned by long-term stakes in the region and, in particular, its own energy, strategic, and commercial interests. From a geopolitical perspective, both Tehran and Moscow desire a weak Azerbaijan that is not closely linked with the West, and the U.S.A in particular. As the two most powerful Caspian littoral states, Russia and Iran, often acting in tandem, have been strongly opposed to the presence of the military forces of third parties in the Caspian Sea, in addition to their efforts to reduce Western presence in the Caspian. 160
Importantly, Russia is the key ally of Armenia, Azerbaijan’s adversary. Since the armed conflict ended in 1994, many in Azerbaijan have laid the blame for the country’s defeat in the Nagorno-Karabakh war – and Azerbaijan’s reluctance to regain the occupied territory by force – on Russia. Still, relations between Moscow and Baku have improved greatly in the past half- decade. A number of fundamental issues in the relations between Russia and Azerbaijan are no longer on their agenda or have been entirely resolved. In 2002, a Russian-Azerbaijani agreement on the demarcation of the Caspian seabed was concluded, and Moscow began attempting to strengthen its influence by
159 Sanam Vakil, “Iran: Balancing East Against West,“ The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 4 (2006), 51-65. 160 For an overview of Russian-Azerbaijani relations, see, for instance, Murat Gul, “Russia and Azerbaijan: Relations since 1989,“ Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 7, no. 2-3 (2008): 47-66.
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68 cooperating with Baku rather than by trying to block its projects, which it was unable to do given the international diplomatic constellation. Since the early 2010s, due to the Azerbaijani authorities’ deteriorating relations with the West over Baku’s crackdown on domestic opposition and media, Moscow and Baku have become closer politically and economically. Baku has also improved its ties with Moscow in the field of military sales, with Russian becoming – strong Armenian protests notwithstanding – the main supplier of advanced weapons to Azerbaijan. 161
which was occupied by the Red Army from 1941 until 1946 during what has been termed the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran. But as noted above, Moscow sponsored the Pishevari puppet regime in Iranian Azerbaijan as well as an analogous puppet state in Iranian Kurdistan called the Mahabad Republic. Although this was a brief episode, the Russian presence on Iranian territory left traces that remain to this day. In Iran’s Azerbaijani provinces, some older people still speak some Russian or have nostalgic memories of Iranian Azerbaijan’s short- lived autonomy, even if under Russian patronage. Although Russia’s influence in Iranian Azerbaijan is limited, Russia is still very interested in picking up on these historical linkages. Russia as such is therefore generally a very popular country among a certain segment of Iran’s Azerbaijanis. 162
Its popularity has grown even more since the Russian armed forces intervened in the Syrian Civil War. As both Iran and Russia support Bashar Assad and the West has been largely ineffective in its handling of the Syrian crisis, many Iranian Azerbaijanis with strong Shiite identity or pro-Iranian sentiments have come to regard Russia as an important ally.
163 On the other hand, Iranian Azerbaijanis sympathetic to Turkey have grown even less favorable of Russia. That being said, Azerbaijani separatism in Iran, possibly backed by external powers, is not in Moscow’s interest as it needs the Islamic Republic to be a stable and predictable partner. Should Iran be weakened as a result of internal problems, Russia is likely to lose an important ally and a counterweight to Western influence
161 John C. K. Daly, “Russia Proclaims ‘Parity’ in Arms Sales to Armenia and Azerbaijan,“ Eurasia Daily Monitor 13, no. 71, April 12 (2016), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45307&cHash=50ed0c9fb1fd 89bbf9070fb9ba288c23#.V08j-ksgdbg. 162
Interviews by Josef Kraus with Iranian Azerbaijanis in Tabriz, Ardabil, and Urmia in August 2012. 163
Interviews by Josef Kraus with Iranian Azerbaijanis in Tabriz, July 2015 and February 2016. Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution 69
in the Middle East. This could pave the way for a stronger presence of the United States, Israel, and other states with which Russia has had troubled relations. Therefore, any strengthening of Azerbaijan through a hypothetical union with Iranian Azerbaijan would contradict Russia’s interests. 70
Conclusion At present, Iran’s Azerbaijanis are visibly disunited. The religious-minded, conservative members of mostly older generations and people living in rural areas identify themselves primarily with their fellow believers. They tend to equate Shiite Islam with the idea of Iranian statehood, and their attitudes towards manifestations of Azerbaijani nationalism – and even of ethnolinguistic and cultural emancipation – range from skeptical to antagonistic. They generally view Sunni Anatolian Turks negatively, and see the Caucasian Azerbaijanis as being “Russified,” in sharp contrast to their fellow Shiites in Iran. Also playing an appreciable role in their self-identification – or in the self-identification some Iranian Azerbaijanis – are decades of Iranian nationalism, which holds that Azerbaijanis are of Iranian origin, while a ‘barbaric’ Turkic origin is regarded as lacking prestige. These people often claim that for the sake of historical justice, the Republic of Azerbaijan should “rejoin Iran” because of shared Shiite heritage and because Caucasian Azerbaijan has from “time immemorial” belonged to Persia. They criticize efforts to achieve ethnolinguistic emancipation by their ethnic kin, or believe the idea of the federalization of Iran to be the result of long-term efforts by the enemies of Iran – Israel, the U.S. and Turkey – to disintegrate the country from within. On the other hand, among secularly-minded Azerbaijanis, and especially among more educated urban youths, the importance of the Shiite faith as a pillar of identity has been in decline. Although there are groups of young people that are trying to find their way to God by gravitating towards Shiism, it is still very rare among Azerbaijani youth to focus heavily on religion. They are usually more interested in a Western life-style and in participation in the growing Azerbaijani economy, not in cultural or religious heritage, conservatism and spirituality. Despite long-term efforts by Tehran to promote Iranian Shiism, the Azerbaijani population continues to resist this influence and the most important religious leaders in Azerbaijan are highly independent of Iranian clerics.
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To a growing extent and impacted by Turkish and Azerbaijani cultural influences, these Iranian Azerbaijanis have tended to claim Turkic origins that differentiate them from Iranian heritage, while self-identifying with increasingly fashionable Turkic nationalism. This alienates them from the idea of Iranian statehood and, in contrast, brings them closer to the Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkey, with which many Azerbaijanis with such attitudes wish to unite. The ongoing war in Syria has given new impetus to these internal cleavages between, roughly speaking, the proponents of these polar ideological camps. Socially conservative rural – and older – Azerbaijanis with strong Shiite and Iranian identity have sided with the Assad regime, expressing increasing resentment against the Sunni Turkish policy in and over Syria. At the same time, many urban Azerbaijanis, indifferent to religion but ascribing themselves to ethnic nationalism, have tended to self-identify with Turkey on political grounds. Thus, while some Iranian Azerbaijanis have volunteered to fight in Syria as part of Iran’s semiformal armed units, suffering casualties, others have burned portraits of the Syrian dictator whilst chanting pro-Turkish slogans. In addition to the polarization within the Iranian Azerbaijani community, emancipatory fervor accompanied by ethnic tension that has gained momentum in northwestern Iran in recent years appears to have contributed to a certain polarization within Iranian society along ethnolinguistic lines. In view of the traditionally strong resistance among relatively liberal Azerbaijani urban youth to the repressive theocratic regime, one may expect this tendency to strengthen. Importantly, in contemporary Iran with its increasingly anti-regime and religiously indifferent urban youth, ethnic nationalism – in the case of Persian nationalism tolerated by Tehran – seems to have been reclaiming its positions. This may pave the ground for mutual antagonism between the dominant Persians and members of other ethnic groups, not least Iranian Azerbaijanis, who see their positions challenged. On the other hand, growing Azerbaijani nationalism in Iran has been marked by negative attitudes not only toward ethnic Persians, but also toward some of Iran’s ethnic minorities, for instance, toward neighboring Kurds, but also Balochis and Arabs. Resultantly, this has complicated the chances for establishing a common front against what many have considered ethnic-Persian dominance in the Islamic Republic. Apparently, Azerbaijani nationalism has been experiencing a phase of active ethnolinguistic and cultural emancipation since the 1990s and especially 2000s. Yet
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72 against the background of the repressive policies carried out in Iran, national emancipation – or any sign of organized dissent for that matter – has been a tough challenge for many. Hence, most ordinary Iranian Azerbaijanis, eager to avoid imprisonment and torture, have sought to distance themselves from expressing overtly political views, let alone views that would associate them with calls for separatism and irredentism. Still, many have taken on the risk of fighting for their constitutional rights. At the same time, an increasingly vocal minority of urbanites – in Tabriz, Ardabil, Urmiye, Marand, Marageh, and some other cities – have gone so far as to manifest demands with clearly political connotations. The mass demonstrations in Iranian Azerbaijan in 2006, 2011, 2012, as well as the rise and politicization of the Tractor Tabriz soccer club along with its popular support base, have all illustrated that Iranian Azerbaijanis have become an increasingly self- confident, united, and visible force in Iranian politics. Soccer, in particular, has come to represent a major forum for Azerbaijani-Persian rivalry and serves as a release valve for ethnic, economic, and political frustration. Today, soccer matches are rife with exhibitions of Azerbaijani nationalism, anti-Persian sentiments, and separatism. While ordinary soccer hooliganism, vandalism, and violent attacks are well known in the European soccer scene, in Iranian Azerbaijan, their causes, motives, and goals are far more sophisticated than was previously the case. Soccer has become the only platform available to gather en masse and express political protest without the threat of immediate punishment. This is why the Tabrizi soccer club has become so popular even beyond the historical capital city of Iranian Azerbaijan. The nascent subculture of soccer hooliganism represents an ideal arena for the radicalization of many young Azerbaijanis and the possible formation of organized groups willing to resort to violence. In addition, the new motivating force in the looming ecological catastrophe of Lake Urmia is of considerable significance. As the lake shrinks, growing numbers of local people appear receptive to conspiracy theories blaming the government in Tehran for purposefully seeking to harm Iranian Azerbaijanis. Thus, protests that were once purely ecological in nature are now becoming increasingly politicized. The ongoing Syrian civil war has slowed the politicization of Iranian Azerbaijanis particularly from rural areas, many of whom have sympathized with those protesting against the drying out of the “Pearl of Azerbaijan.” The same holds for the “politicization of Azerbaijani jokes” that the Islamic Republic has witnessed since the mid-2000s. The often insensitive attitude of authorities in Tehran toward
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what many in the Iranian Azerbaijani provinces consider a matter of ethnic – or regional – honor has apparently galvanized hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis, regardless of prior political stances. Against this background, the effect of the Syrian civil war may well hold in the short term, while the overall evolution of the Iranian Azerbaijani minority – with its calls for more ethnolinguistic and cultural emancipation – would hardly change in the years to come. In fact, although Azerbaijani efforts towards emancipation and protests against the regime have been overshadowed by the overall mass unrest following the problematic presidential election in 2009 during the years of the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad presidency, they continue to represent an increasingly potent challenge to Iran’s internal security and integrity. The regime’s reaction to protests shows its awareness that universities have become one of the emerging centers of resistance – leading to the strengthening of the regime’s own presence on campus. In the years to come, the prospective strengthening of Azerbaijani separatism – still a work in progress – will be an incomparably greater threat to territorial integrity than the already active Kurds, Balochs, or even the Khuzestan Arabs, due to the fact that the Azerbaijanis represent the country’s largest ethnic minority. Unlike the marginalized and Sunni minorities, many members of the Azerbaijani minority play leading roles in Iranian society and hold great influence in the state and security apparatus. In addition, Iranian Azerbaijan is of great strategic importance to the country because of both the region’s significant agricultural production and its position; major export routes pass through the Azerbaijani provinces en route to Turkey and Western Europe. Last but not least, growing separatist aspirations among Azerbaijanis could also impact Iran’s smaller Turkic minorities, e.g. the nearly 1.5 million East-Mazandarani and Khorasani Turkmens settled near the border with Turkmenistan. Iran’s Azerbaijanis are no less important from the perspective of international relations. It should be noted that foreign powers have not sought to exploit this potential “fifth column” in the Islamic Republic at all; neither the United States nor Israel provided significant support to the Azerbaijani emancipation movement during their most acute confrontation with Tehran. But as Azerbaijani nationalism becomes politicized, it in turn increases the potential for the Iranian Azerbaijani card to be played by external players aiming to weaken the Islamic Republic. It cannot be ruled out in the future, especially if Iran resumes its efforts to seek Souleimanov & Kraus
74 nuclear capabilities, or the current détente between Iran and the West concludes for other reasons. As for the Republic of Azerbaijan, it plays more of a role because of what it is than because of what it does. Baku’s official policy distances itself from the Iranian Azerbaijani question as an internal Iranian affair, but the influence of secular nationalists from the north can still be felt in the south, and the statehood of the Republic of Azerbaijan has a strong motivating effect on Iran’s Azerbaijanis, many of whom aspire to such statehood. Even so, a considerable number of Iran’s Azerbaijanis tend mainly to look toward Turkey for inspiration. Besides Turkey’s ethno-linguistic and cultural closeness, it is also attractive because of its development and its advanced economy and sophisticated cultural exports, as well as relationships established through trade, tourism and employment. But Turkey’s role is not clear; the discrepancy between Turkey’s economic and energy needs on the one hand, and its ethnic and political interests on the other, inhibit Turkic activism in its approach to the Azerbaijani minority in Iran. While Israel may be most inclined to play the Azerbaijani card in the future, some sort of cooperation with Ankara or Baku would be necessary, a prospect that is highly unlikely given the current situation. By comparison, Russia is a strong Iranian ally, and has showed its willingness to intervene in Middle Eastern affairs to shore up a vulnerable allied regime. In case of troubles in Iranian Azerbaijan, Moscow could be expected to support severe repressive measures by the Iranian regime against Azerbaijani protests, and to use its international leverage to undermine any efforts to internationalize the issue. At some point in its history, every multiethnic state may face an internal threat to its territorial integrity that could be possibly backed by external forces. If the loyalty of the Azerbaijanis to the idea of Iranian statehood were ever to be challenged, this would dramatically weaken Iran’s internal security and have enormous implications for the region. And while the threat of Iranian Azerbaijanis revolting against Tehran is still intangible, as our monograph has implied, it is likely to occur not because of external interventions, but rather because of clumsy policies of the Iranian authorities unwilling to meet the basic demands of one of its ethnic minorities.
75 Authors’ Bio Emil A. Souleimanov, Ph.D. is Associate Professor of Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Institute of International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague. His main focus is on security and conflict, with emphasis on the Caucasus and the adjacent areas of Turkey, Russia, and Iran. His work has appeared in International Security, World Politics, Journal of Strategic Studies,
elsewhere.
Strategic Studies, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University in Brno. His main focus is on Islamic radicalism, terrorism, and ethnic and resource conflicts, with territorial emphasis on Iran and the Middle East. His work has appeared in a variety of Czech and international journals, including Middle East Policy, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Middle Eastern Review of International Affairs, etc. Yüklə 0,58 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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