Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution
57
that have dominated the bilateral relations appear to have been put on the
backburner.”
129
While Azerbaijani-Iranian relations have seen periods of heated conflict and
cooperation in the recent years, their impact on Iran’s Azerbaijani community has
been modest. Notably, cognizant of its limited room for maneuver, Baku has
sought to keep a low profile on the Iranian Azerbaijani issue in order not to
antagonize its powerful neighbor over. Even at the peak of Iranian Azerbaijani
protests in Urmia and elsewhere, Azerbaijani authorities sought to distance
themselves from commenting on what they considered the Islamic Republic’s
internal affairs. While Azerbaijan is likely to have cooperated closely with Israel on
intelligence matters, most probably involving Iran, nothing suggests that Baku
sought to infiltrate Iranian Azerbaijan in order to stir separatism and irredentism
in their ranks.
A certain unofficial influence of the Azerbaijani government on the Iranian
Azerbaijani community does, however, exist. Some allegations exist, so far
unsubstantiated, that the soccer team Tractor Sazi receives financial support from
Baku, albeit not officially and mainly for the team’s facilities and supplementary
activities rather than directly towards operations.
130
The aforementioned debate in
the Azerbaijani parliament, clearly condoned by the leadership, over renaming the
country was episodic and their message symbolic; it was rather a forewarning in
the chain of mutual confrontation than a tangible act. With the exception of
episodic pro-independence statements made by the representatives of Azerbaijani
political parties with regard to Iranian Azerbaijan, this has been the only public
appeal made by Azerbaijan’s state representatives more or less explicitly in the
direction of Iranian Azerbaijan since president Abulfaz Elchibey’s infamous
statements in the early 1990s.
131
Indeed, from time to time, triggered by vociferous events in Iranian Azerbaijan,
mass demonstrations take place in Azerbaijani cities in support of Iranian
129
Fariz Ismailzade, “A breakthrough in Iran-Azerbaijan relations?“ Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, February
19, 2016, http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13330-a-breakthrough-in-iran-
azerbaijan-relations?.html.
130
We found hard to verify this information which may be a rumor, yet is quite widespread within
Azerbaijani soccer community. Josef Kraus carried out dozens of interviews about this topic with fans of
Tabriz Sazi in the period of 2011-2016.
131
Back then, at the peak of Azerbaijan‘s military confrontation with Armenia and facing a pro-Armenian
Russia, Azerbaijan‘s nationalist president Elchibey publicly stated that the “unification of Azerbaijan was a
matter of three to five years at most.“
Souleimanov & Kraus
58
Azerbaijani co-ethnics and their struggle for ethnolinguistic rights. For the most
part, Azerbaijani authorities rarely crack down on such events. While the leader of
the Iranian Azerbaijani emancipation movement, Chehregani, was prompted by
Baku to leave the country following Tehran’s vehement protests, Azerbaijani
authorities have tolerated the formal presence of SANAM and other pro-Iranian
Azerbaijani independentist groups in the country. To some extent, the Iranian
Azerbaijani card is useful to Baku for exerting limited diplomatic pressure on Iran
– if nothing else, to counter Tehran’s pro-Armenian stance, its export of radicalism,
and its position on the Caspian sea.
132
Yet by and large, the watchful Azerbaijani
authorities have sought to distance themselves as much as possible from events in
Iranian Azerbaijan, while trying not to eradicate the pro-Iranian Azerbaijan
movement, a source of increasingly vocal Azerbaijani nationalism, on Azerbaijani
soil.
A much stronger force than diplomatic or intelligence activity seems to be
presented in the exchange of ideas that has been taking place between Iranian and
Caucasian Azerbaijanis since the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. Azerbaijanis on both
sides of the Araxes River have become increasingly close, which is partially caused
by a significant increase in Azerbaijani cultural influence in Iranian Azerbaijan over
the last five to ten years. From their encounters with their northern relatives and
co-ethnics in Azerbaijani Republic, Iranian Azerbaijanis – usually from urban areas
– often bring back nationalist and separatist ideas. The smouldering conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan – particularly occasional hostilities on the line of
contact in Nagorno-Karabakh – strengthens the sense of solidarity between
Azerbaijanis from Iran and their ethnic kin in the South Caucasus. On the other
hand, as the next chapter illustrates, while the ongoing war in Syria has had a rather
marginal effect on Azerbaijanis to the north of the Araxes River, the Syrian war has
entailed Shia upheaval among Iranian Azerbaijanis who predominantly appear to
side with Iranian policies in general and Bashar al-Assad in particular. Yet cultural
differences between Russified Azerbaijanis and segments of the socially
conservative Persianized Azerbaijanis community, as illustrated in the above
chapters, are too large to allow for a perfectly harmonious relationship between co-
ethnics from the opposite sides of the Araxes River.
132
Irina Morozova, “Contemporary Azerbaijani Historiography on the Problem of ‘Southern Azerbaijan’
after World War II.” Iran and the Caucasus, 9, no. 1 (2005), 85-120.