Souleimanov & Kraus
48
Hezbollah is not frequent or massive
in the Azerbaijani territories,
where the group
does not have a large membership base. Its presence is felt strongly only in Tabriz,
where it has assisted the Basij. Ruhollah Bejani, the leader of Ansar-e Hezbollah in
Tabriz, attracted widespread attention in late 2011, when he began to rhetorically
attack the Azerbaijani consulate in that city in reaction to secularist policies enacted
by the Republic of Azerbaijan.
103
In April 2012, he repeated his demand for the
closing of the consulate, even appealing to President Ahmadinejad with a reference
to the consulate’s alleged plans to hold a “gay parade” in Tabriz.
104
His demands
were not heeded, and Ansar-e Hezbollah was further marginalized in the eyes of
local residents.
The Basij have proved useful for greater control over the university environment.
During the latter half of the 2000s, the regime began packing faculties with loyal
instructors, leading to the creation of a Teacher’s Basij Organization, which was
supposed to strengthen the influence of its members over other academics and the
manner of instruction. The organization claims to have over 15,000 members,
collecting a quarter of all university teachers. There is also a Students’ Basij
Organization for monitoring compliance with morality and for the possible
controlled mobilization of students. For many people, membership in Basij
represents the only possibility for getting a university education, and thus the
Students’ Basij Organization has over 650,000 members at 700 Iranian higher
education institutions. The organization’s main tasks include coordinated
confrontations with reform activists and pressure on university administrations
concerning schools’ social, moral, and political shortcomings.
This pro-regime structure not only limits and controls academic freedom, but also
serves the rapid suppression of student uprisings and protests of any kind.
According to university students in Tabriz,
105
the system operates through a
network of infiltrating informants who report to
Basij and other components of the
Iranian security apparatus virtually in real time about practically all student
activities that involve even a hint of political activism. Because these associations,
often created ad hoc, tend to be dispersed very quickly and their leaders (or all
participants) arrested, interrogated, or even jailed and expelled from school, most
103
“Hezbollah Threatens to Stop Activity of Azerbaijani Consulate General in Tabriz,” News.Az, November
1, 2011, http://www.news.az/articles/48006.
104
“Iranian Clergyman Vows to Close Azerbaijan’s Consulate in Tabriz,”
Panorama.am, April 16, 2012,
http://www.panorama.am/en/society/2012/04/16/gays-azerbayjan/.
105
Interview by Josef Kraus with several students at the University of Tabriz, August 2012, March 2013.
Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution
49
student communication and organization has been moved into the virtual space of
social networks and discussion forums during the last three years. This has led to
a situation where the individual members of various student groups and
movements do not know each other personally, and all of their communication is
based on knowledge of the communications channel and of the nicknames of other
members. This has an additional security implication, because these people first
meet each other when a protest of some kind is held, but without knowing each
other’s identities, and this makes it literally impossible to trace additional
individuals by interrogating arrested protesters.
The efficiency of the regime’s security structures at universities in the Azerbaijani
provinces was quite apparent during the post-election demonstrations in 2009,
when paramilitary units cracked down on student riots. Basij units even raided
university campuses and student dormitories, where there were clashes and mass
arrests.
106
The raids at the University of Tabriz were especially harsh. The beatings,
arrests, and aggressive interrogations of students, destruction of property, and
liquidation of opposition student groups pushed the locals towards nationalism at
a time when the events at the universities in Tabriz were being compared with
those in Tehran. While the raids at the University of Tehran were investigated by
a specially created committee of the Iranian National Security Council, the
incidents in Tabriz were ignored. The local press immediately began to ask why
investigations were being conducted differently in Tabriz.
107
Originally directed
against the election results, the demonstrations and student riots quickly acquired
an ethnic dimension.
Besides the direct suppression of already active riots and demonstrations, the
Iranian regime also uses sophisticated methods to infiltrate, monitor, and liquidate
separatist groups right at their inception. According to information from the region
confirmed by Iranian government officials and academics, separatist cells are
forming among the ranks of fans of Tractor Sazi, leading to the politicizing of their
demands. These cells generally gather in Nakhchivan, an exclave of the Republic
of Azerbaijan where Iranians citizens can travel without a visa. Since it would be
dangerous for the regime to ban the soccer team outright, the Tehran government
106
Robert Tait, Julian Borger, “Iran Election: Mass Arrests and Campus Raids as Regime Hits Back,”
The
Guardian, June 17, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/17/iran-election-protests-arrests1.
107
“Students Protest in Tabriz Crushed with Utter Violence,”
Iran Press Service, August 12, 2009,
http://www.iran-press-service.com/articles/students_killed_12899.html.