Souleimanov & Kraus
44
Iranian president. The Azerbaijani provinces turned out to be among his main
electoral bastions, and to a considerable extent, he can attribute his success to those
provinces. Our interviews with Iranian Azerbaijanis during the campaign and the
election itself indicate that Rouhani won the favor of Iran’s ethnic minorities (not
only the Azerbaijanis, but also the Kurds, Arabs, Balochs etc.) because Rouhani,
during the campaign, did not present himself in the role of a pro-Persian centralist,
and in fact mentioned the honoring of the rights of minorities within Iran’s
territory. He expressed an inclination towards greater decentralization of the
country and the shifting of some power to the individual regions. Quite logically,
he was then viewed as the opposite of conservative, power-oriented candidates
like Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf or Mohsen Rezaee. Iranians generally perceive that
Rouhani’s win was a concession to the regime, which, given the extent of Rouhani’s
support, feared mass unrest if a different candidate had won. On the other hand,
Rouhani is not considered a problematic or uncomfortable president for the
regime.
Moreover, in 2013 the Iranian regime was much better prepared for any security
complications and demonstrations than it had been in 2009. The state apparatus,
which had not been fully prepared at the time, had been working strenuously to
liquidate or infiltrate opposition movements and especially to increase its control
over universities, which had been the main flashpoints of protests in 2009.
Opposition to the ruling regime can partially unite Iran’s Azerbaijanis with other
opposition currents. This was the case during the presidential election in 2013,
when Rouhani won valuable points in Iran’s periphery. The interests of many non-
Persian nationalities have thus merged with those of the Persian modernists who
united in opposition to the conservative power-oriented candidates, but certain
barriers still exist, because a considerable portion of the Persian opposition to the
regime’s theocratic government is based on Persian nationalism, which is equally
antagonistic towards Turkic nationalism as the present regime is.
Lake Urmia and the Nationalization of the Environmental Movement
The demonstrations against the poor condition of Lake Urmia are another
important set of antigovernment protests that have gradually been assuming
strongly ethnic overtones. The lake itself, lying on the border between the Iranian
Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution
45
provinces of West and East Azerbaijan, is a natural wonder, and has been classified
by UNESCO as a biosphere reserve.
89
Lake Urmia is a salt lake without an outlet, and is threatened by the intensification
of agriculture in its vicinity. Because of the growing consumption of water from
the rivers that feed the lake and the construction of more than thirty dams on those
streams, the size of the lake has gradually shrunk, and fears exist that it could dry
up completely. Iranian officials have not taken any serious measures to keep the
lake from drying up, although the matter is receiving growing levels of attention.
The lake is not only a valuable biotope, but also one of the symbols of South
Azerbaijan.
90
The level of the lake drops by around 24-39 inches per year.
Moreover, the drying up of this extremely salty lake is causing not only an
environmental catastrophe for local plant and animal species, but also a threat to
the surrounding area. The strong winds in this region carry salt to places many
miles from the dried up surface, destroying the local flora and fauna, and also
causing health problems for humans.
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It is estimated that more than 60 percent of
the lake has dried up, and many people from the surrounding area have
abandoned the region as a result of health complications and problems with raising
crops, and have moved to cities. Because of frequent salt storms and other
problems, nearly fifty villages in the area are said to have been completely
abandoned.
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That, however, may only be the beginning, because problems with
the lake and with water affect the whole region, which has a population of 6.5
million people, leading to potential large-scale devastation and out-migration.
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89
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), “Biosphere Reserve
Information: Lake Oromeeh,” January 18, 2001,
http://www.unesco.org/mabdb/br/brdir/directory/biores.asp?code=IRA+07&mode=all.
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Michael Hogan, “Lake Urmia,” in Encyclopedia of Earth, ed. Cutler J. Cleveland (Washington D. C.:
Environmental Information Coalition, National Council for Science and the Environment, 2011),
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Lake_Urmia?topic=49560.
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Saeed K. Dehghan, “Iranian Greens Fear Disaster as Lake Orumieh Shrinks: Football Chants and Street
Protests Raise Profile of Fight to Save Unesco-listed Site,”
The Guardian, September 5, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/05/iran-greens-lake-orumieh-shrinks.
92
“Preserving the world second largest hypersaline lake under future irrigation and climate change,” Radio
Farda, January 13, 2013, http://www.radiofarda.com/content/f10-pm-says-50-vilage-deserted-over-lake-
urmia-shrinkage/24822635.html.
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Francesco Femia, Caitlin Werrell, “Socio-environmental Impacts of Iran’s Disappearing Lake Urmia,“ The
Center for Climate & Security, 2012, http://climateandsecurity.org/2012/05/18/socio-environmental-impacts-
of-irans-disappearing-lake-urmia/.