Souleimanov & Kraus
36
But others, particularly the leader of the organization, former linguistics professor
Mahmudali Chehregani (Mahmudəli Çöhrəqanlı in Azerbaijani),
69
have seen their
task in promoting Azerbaijani identity and prompting the Iranian authorities to
allow teaching in Azerbaijani as stipulated by the Constitution of the Islamic
Republic.
70
In 2002, while based in the West, Chehregani asserted that SANAM
“support[ed] the territorial integrity of Iran and [did] not seek unification with
Republic of Azerbaijan or Turkey.”
71
In recent years, Chehregani has spoken out in
favor of the federalization of Iran: "a federal structure [in Iran] resembling the
United States, where Azeris can have their own flag and parliament.”
72
According
to this perspective, in a federalized and united country, Azerbaijani provinces –-
like the rest of multiethnic Iran – could be granted a cultural, administrative, and
possibly even fiscal autonomy. Since around the mid-2000s, Chehregani has in his
public statements largely sought to profile himself as a devout anti-regime fighter
concerned with the cultural rights of Iran’s ethnic minorities rather than a leader of
an ethno-separatist movement.
Still, Chehregani’s political views – and the political orientation of SANAM – seem
to be unclear. For instance, in a public speech at Johns Hopkins University’s Central
Asia-Caucasus Institute in April of 2003, Chehregani explicitly spoke of “Persian
enemies” who separated the Azerbaijani people in the 19
th
century. He also asserted
that there was “widespread support for independence” among Iranian
Azerbaijanis who had been seeing the “revival of nationalism” – and that the
“illegitimate theocracy” was to collapse “within three to five years.”
73
In some of
his numerous appearances on Günaz TV, an Iranian Azerbaijani-run and Chicago-
based television station with a strong nationalist and separatist agenda, he spoke
of the neighboring provinces of Iranian Azerbaijan without Azerbaijani majority –
69
Chehregani was elected to the Iranian Majlis in 1996. Soon thereafter, the authorities annulled his election
and arrested him, apparently following Chehregani’s public protests after his course on Turkish linguistics
at Tabriz University was closed by the authorities. Chehregani was re-arrested in 1999 and subjected to
torture while imprisoned. This prohibited him from running in 2000. Chehregani was freed from prison
and allowed to leave Iran owing to the personal interference of Senator Sam Brownback (R). For more on
Chehregani, see, for instance, Riaux, *The Formative Years of Azerbaijani Nationalism in Post-
Revolutionary Iran,“ 53-56.
70
Afshin Molavi, “Iran’s Azeri Question: What Does Iran’s Largest Ethnic Minority Want?“ Eurasianet.org,
April 14, 2003, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/culture/articles/eav041503.shtml.
71
Quoted in Roger Howard, Iran in Crisis? The Future of The Revolutionary Regime and the US Response (New
York: Zed Books, 2004), 182.
72
Molavi, “Iran‘s Azeri Question”.
73
“Azeri Separatist Meets Policy Makers in Washington,“ National Iranian American Council, April 10, 2003,
http//www.niacouncil.org/azeri-separatist-meets-policy-makers-in-washington/.
Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution
37
Qazvin, Hamadan, Tehran, Arak, and portions of Kordestan and Gilan – as parts
of historical Azerbaijan. He also made implicit references to the ultimate goal of
unifying Azerbaijan, along with his positive portrayal of the brief period of post-
Second World War independence of Iranian Azerbaijan. Besides, the website of
SANAM includes images of its leader showing a pan-Turkist salutation, with
Persians constantly referenced as “chauvinists.”
74
To sum up, while Chehregani
has generally sought to avoid being explicit about the secession of Iranian
Azerbaijan as a goal of his SANAM, his rhetoric has been interpreted by many as
implying just that.
The reasons for this ambiguity can be formed from the following arguments. First,
in 2002, after Tehran’s pressure on Baku where Chehregani had been briefly based
after leaving Iran, Chehregani was exiled to the United States where he has lived
since. However, the party itself is still formally based in Baku. Due to Tehran
keeping an eye on Baku’s attitude toward the Iranian Azerbaijan question and
Azerbaijani authorities’ resultant reluctance to irritate Iran, SANAM has not
received support from Azerbaijani authorities, apart from tolerance of their
symbolic presence in a Baku apartment. Consequently, SANAM has become a
paralyzed group of local enthusiasts rather than a political movement. Second,
with the organization reduced to several activists and a formal – and distant – head,
Chehregani’s influence on the ground has become minimal. Besides, there is no
reliable data as to the actual support for SANAM among Iranian Azerbaijanis
within Iran.
75
Many Iranian Azerbaijanis in the diaspora have expressed positive
attitudes toward the organization and its goals of emancipation, while some have
expressed support for its presumably separatist agenda. Yet most have coalesced
around Chehregani being a rather symbolic figure without actual clout.
76
Third,
and closely related, Chehregani himself appears to have maneuvered between his
hardcore support base among Northern Azerbaijanis, which is rather strong, but
an undefined – and possibly weak – support base within Iranian Azerbaijan itself.
In addition to SANAM, some other emancipationist groups have existed since the
1990s. These include the South Azerbaijan National Liberation Movement,
established in 1991 (SANLM or NLMSA, Cənubi Azərbaycan Milli Azadlıq Hərəkatı);
74
See the website of SANAM devoted to its head, http://gamoh.org/basqan/.
75
During our fieldwork in Iranian Azerbaijan, we sought to avoid posing direct questions about the locals’
support for SANAM due to security considerations.
76
Authors’ numerous discussion with many Iranian Azerbaijanis in Iran, U.S.A, and Europe, 2010-2014.