Souleimanov & Kraus
30
unacceptable to speak Azerbaijani Turkish in public. This development is
conditioned by several factors both in Iran as a whole and in the country’s
Azerbaijani provinces.
One of the most important causes for the new flourishing of Azerbaijani
nationalism in Iran is declining self-identification with the theocratic state and
religion and the strengthening of ethnic nationalism throughout the country. Many
young Iranians are dissatisfied with the restrictive rule of the clerics, and this was
reinforced in particular during the bloody unrest surrounding the reelection of
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009. Many young Iranians identify with the theocracy
to a far lesser extent than the generation of their parents.
54
Throughout society and
especially in urban environments, there is widespread disillusion about the
theocratic form of government and resistance to its fundamentalist manifestations.
Many educated Iranians distance themselves from religious identification, and
instead admire the West. The same applies to the Azerbaijanis. Weakening self-
identification with the regime and religion leads to a search for an alternative
ideology, for many meaning the revival of (ethnic) nationalism. Among Persians,
this involves an ever expanding role of Persian nationalism, which turns to the pre-
Islamic traditions of the empires of Persia’s glorious past.
55
This development is
also reflected by the production of an ever increasing number of films and literature
glorifying the pre-Islamic past of the Persians. This results in fertile soil for conflicts
between Turkic (Azerbaijani) and Iranian (Persian) nationalisms.
56
Informal
interviews by the authors with the inhabitants of Tehran, Ardabil, and other
Iranian-Azerbaijani cities from 2010 to 2014 indicate that an ever increasing number
of Azerbaijanis claim an ethnolinguistic Turkic (Türk or torki) identity rather than a
local (Tabrizi, Ardabili) or a more neutral regional (Azerbaijani) or national (Iranian)
identity as was more common in past years.
While recent events might challenge this, for the kind of young Iranians described
above, Turkey represents a free, pro-Western, and relatively advanced country that
is, moreover, politically and militarily powerful. Last but not least, Turkey is
perceived as a country that is more ‘European’ than Iran. Iranians have lately
54
Nastaran Moosavi, “Secularism in Iran,“ in Secularism and Secularity. Contemporary International
Perspectives, eds. Barry A. Kosmin And Ariela Keysar, (Hartford: ISSSC, 2007), 143–145.
55
Kamyar Abdi, “Nationalism, Politics, and the Development of Archeology in Iran,” American Journal of
Archeology 105, no. 1, January (2001): 51-76.
56
Association for Defense of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran, “Racism in Contemporary Iran: an
Interview with Alireza Asgharzadeh,” October 9, 2009.
Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution
31
become fond of Turkish seaside resorts, and most Iranian families of the urban
middle class visit Antalya, Antakya, or Bodrum.
57
For many Iranians, Turkish
identities is associated with more liberal, modern, militarily powerful, and
advanced Turkey and not without prestige. This naturally has some impact on the
perception of Azerbaijani ‘Turks’ as well. In Tabriz, the authors have routinely
encountered Azerbaijanis both in public cafés and in their homes who cheer mainly
for a Turkish soccer team or Turkish athletes participating in world championships.
Turks were often referred to as ‘ours’ (bizimki).
Many Iranians, and especially those of Azerbaijani origin, travel to Turkey for
work. Many Azerbaijanis with whom the authors were able to speak between 2010
and 2014, especially those from Tabriz, view Turkey not only as a sort of dreamland
where “we Turks live well,” but also as a trampoline into Western Europe for a
better life. There they encounter very strong Turkish nationalism and
consciousness of Turkic solidarity, which strengthens their ethno-linguistic
consciousness and reduces a certain psychological handicap ingrained in them
since the days of the shahs. The reception of Turkish and Azerbaijani satellite
broadcasts also plays a significant role in the context of the ongoing emancipation
of Iran’s Azerbaijanis. Although the use of satellite dishes is formally banned in
Iran, it became common in northwestern Iran in the 1990s to watch Turkish
television stations, which offer a wider selection of programs that are incomparably
more interesting than strictly censored Iranian television. During repeated stays in
Tabriz, the authors have had the opportunity to observe the growing popularity of
Turkish culture and, in particular, pop culture.
Regularly watching Turkish television broadcasts helps reinforce consciousness of
Turkish solidarity, and helps improve the language skills of the viewers. Over the
past decade, the number of expressions from Anatolian Turkish in the language of
Iran’s Azerbaijanis has increased markedly.
58
57
Hürriyet, “İranlı turistler Türkiye'ye geliyor,” [Iranian Tourists Come to Turkey] February 22, 2011,
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/17087969.asp.
58
Fardin Alikhan, “The Politics of Satellite Television in Iran,” in Media, Culture and Society in Iran, ed.
Mehdi Semati (New York: Routledge, 2008), 98.