Souleimanov & Kraus
32
The Impact of Independent Azerbaijan on the Azerbaijani minority of
Iran
Aside from looking up to Turkey, an ever increasing identification with the
Caucasian Azerbaijanis, who gained independence in 1991, has developed in Iran’s
northwestern provinces. But the attitude of Iran’s Azerbaijanis towards post-Soviet
Azerbaijan cannot be regarded a priori as boundlessly positive or admiring. Many
secular and nationalistic minded Iranian Azerbaijanis are enthusiastic about the
attributes of the Republic of Azerbaijan as a state, of which they have a
romanticized perception, and the nationalistic literature and films from the north
contribute to this.
59
However, the attitude of a large portion of the Iranian
Azerbaijanis towards the so-called
shuravi “Soviets”, as the northern Azerbaijanis
are often called to this day, also has a number of negative attributes.
An impact of the partition of Azerbaijan between Russia and Persia in 1828 was the
noticeable cultural Russification of the population of northern Azerbaijan, and
under the Soviet regime, that population also underwent vigorous secularization.
By contrast, Iran’s Azerbaijanis have preserved many elements of traditional
patriarchal life, and Islam in particular. The division of the nation into northern
and southern parts thus resulted in the formation of cultures and identities in the
two related populations that differ and are, in many respects, antagonistic:
secularism, Russification, and nationalism vis-à-vis Russia and Armenia on the
northern side, and religious conservatism, Persification, and nationalism vis-à-vis
a centralized, Persian-dominated Iran on the southern side. Because of the
differences in the ways the two groups define themselves, there are also a number
of prejudices and stereotypes held by each part of the Azerbaijani population
concerning the other. People from the north view or disparagingly describe the
Iranian Azerbaijanis as religious fanatics and reactionaries. Indictments made from
the other direction concern a loss of identity, irreligiousness, and alcoholism.
Obviously, their separation for several generations and the effects of completely
different cultural-political currents have created considerable contradictions that
cannot be overcome or overlooked as easily as many nationalists on both sides of
the divided territory often seem to think. Some disillusion has taken hold following
the euphoria of the early 1990s, when the border on the Araxes River was relaxed
59
Cameron Brown, “Observations from Azerbaijan,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 6, no. 4,
December (2002): 68.
Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution
33
for the first time in fifty years, and the Azerbaijanis from the north and south were
able to visit each other. The Iranian and the post-Soviet Azerbaijanis have, after all,
realized how many striking cultural differences separate them.
Iranian Azerbaijanis are themselves divided along a line of demarcation between
religion and nationalism. Religiously minded, conservative people, especially of
the older generations, identify themselves primarily with their fellow believers.
They equate Shiite Islam with the idea of Iranian statehood, and they take a
skeptical, even antagonistic stance towards manifestations of Azerbaijani
nationalism. They generally regard the Anatolian Turks negatively as Sunnis, and
the Caucasian Azerbaijanis as “Russified.” It is no coincidence that Iranian
Azerbaijan‘s rural provinces are quite conservative, “the Azeri provinces
traditionally have a strong conservative vote, and have not always favored
reformists even when they were native sons.”
60
In an environment of individuals with such attitudes, the argument is often made
that the Republic of Azerbaijan should join with Iran or with Iranian Azerbaijan.
This is built on the notion that “we’re all Shiites,” and Caucasian Azerbaijan has
historically always belonged to Persia.
61
Among this group, pan-Shiite opinions are
widespread, with visions of the creation of a consolidated Shiite territory (similar
to what is called the “Shia Crescent”) encompassing the Shiite portion of
Afghanistan and Iraq along with Lebanon, Syria, and above all, greater Azerbaijan
and Iran. It should, however, be noted that the people the authors of this text
interviewed spoke of these contingencies as mere fantasy, and appeared aware that
such visions are unfeasible.
On the other hand, especially among young, secular-minded Azerbaijanis, the
Shiite religion is of decreasing importance, and they tend to assert their Turkic
origins and to profess Turkic Azerbaijani nationalism. That ideology leads them to
support a union with the Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkey. Moreover, during the
last twenty years there has been an intensification of mutual contacts between the
Azerbaijanis of the two countries. Thanks to the breakup of the Soviet Union, the
de-radicalization of the Islamic Republic, and a generally more relaxed
60
Rasmus Christian Elling, “Tribal Hands and Minority Votes: Ethnicity, Regionalism and Elections in
Iran,“
Ethnic and Racial Studies 38, no. 14: 2541.
61
Svante Cornell, “Iranian Azerbaijan: A Brewing Hotspot,”
Presentation to Symposium on “Human
Rights and Ethnicity in Iran”, November 22, 2004, organized by the Moderate (conservative) party,
Swedish Parliament, Stockholm
, http://southaz.blogspot.com/2008/03/iranian-azerbaijan-brewing-
hotspot.html.