Souleimanov & Kraus
34
atmosphere, growing numbers of tourists, merchants etc. are crossing the border
in both directions. Many Iranian Azerbaijanis travel (some even fly) to Baku for
entertainment – to drink alcohol and go to nightclubs and places of merriment. A
place commonly frequented by less wealthy Iranians is the border town of Astara,
to which trips are made primarily to consume alcohol. Understandably, the
affordability of such ‘excursions’ means that these two groups of inhabitants of
different countries are encountering each other with growing frequency, coming
into contact not only in northern Azerbaijan, but also in Turkey. There is also
temporary migration from northern Azerbaijan to Iran. Because of the high cost of
healthcare in Baku and other cities of Azerbaijan, many travel to hospitals in Tabriz
or Ardabil in what amounts to medical tourism.
62
In recent years, the nationalistic Azerbaijani community has witnessed a noticeable
shift in preference for an orientation towards Turkey rather than Azerbaijan. As
paradoxical as that might seem at first glance, it is a result, among other things, of
the perception that the present-day Republic of Azerbaijan is a small country that
is relatively weak economically, militarily, and politically, plagued by corruption,
under authoritarian rule, and has suffered the humiliation of military defeat.
63
For
example, one young Iranian diplomat of Azerbaijani origin confided to the author
that he could see no rational reason for Iranian Azerbaijan to join with the Republic
of Azerbaijan, because while the (Shiite) citizens of Iran have the possibility of
enrolling at a university, completing their education, and securing career
advancement on the basis of their own efforts and abilities without having to rely
on connections, in Azerbaijan, that is very difficult.
64
This is another reason why,
somewhat paradoxically, Iranian Azerbaijanis identify more with Turkey – a
country that has until recently been freer, far less corrupt, and militarily and
economically more powerful than the Republic of Azerbaijan. Instead of
Azerbaijani nationalism, one increasingly sees pan-Turkic tendencies that are
further reinforced by the strengthening of Turkey’s role in the fields of economics
and regional politics.
62
Iranian Azerbaijanis can also be found in large numbers on excursions for alcohol etc. in neighboring
Armenia; despite the animosity between the two nationalities since the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh,
many Azerbaijanis with Iranian passports travel to Armenia without problems.
63
Brenda Shaffer, “The Formation of Azerbaijani Collective Identity in Iran,” Nationalities Papers 28, no. 3
(2000): 470.
64
Interview in September 2010.
Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution
35
Another segment of the educated and fully integrated Iranian Azerbaijani
community regards itself as an integral part of not only the Iranian, but also the
Persian nation. According to the proponents of this line of thought, which is
especially prevalent in the environment of Azerbaijani intellectuals, industrialists,
and educators in Tehran, the Azerbaijanis are linguistically Turkified Persians, who
have maintained their original Persianness in their ‘genes,’ which is apparent in
their lighter, more ‘European’ appearance by Iranian standards.
65
Nationalist Organizations of Iranian Azerbaijan
Among the Iranian Azerbaijani groups with emancipatory or separatist agendas,
the South Azerbaijani National Awakening Movement (SANAM, Güney
Azərbaycan Milli Oyanış Hərəkatı) is the most well-known. Established in Baku in
1995, SANAM has been a mystery to many. Some of its members and supporters –
usually based outside Iran either in the Azerbaijani Republic or within Iranian
Azerbaijani diaspora communities in Turkey and Europe – have called for the
unification of Azerbaijanis living on both sides of the Araxes River.
66
SANAM itself
has a lucidly irredentist motto.
67
The flag of Iranian Azerbaijan adopted by the
organization bears a clear resemblance to that of the independent Azerbaijani
Republic. The very self-designation as South Azerbaijan in the title of the
organization is seen by many Iranians of various ethnic backgrounds – including
Iranian Azerbaijanis – as a politicized move with noticeably irredentist overtones.
68
65
The importance of race in the background is also acknowledged by some young, more nationalistically
(whether Turkic or Persian) oriented Azerbaijanis in Tabriz and other cities of Iranian Azerbaijan, according
to whom the discrimination in Iran is not (merely) an ethno-linguistic matter, but instead racial. According
to them, Iran historically has been and still is ruled by Northerners with relatively light complexions, in
whose numbers the Azerbaijanis are also counted, while the natives of the southern areas – Khuzestani
Arabs, Balochs from the southeast of the country, Khorasani Turkmens with Mongoloid features, and
darker Persians from areas around the Persian Gulf are not infrequently subjected to discrimination.
According to them, this manifests itself not only in the areas of education and career opportunities, but also,
for example, in interethnic marriages: while, for example, nothing would hinder the marriage of a Persian,
Mazandarani, or Gilani woman to an Azerbaijani man, racial and cultural stereotypes often complicate the
choice of natives of northern areas who decide to join their fates to Southerners in particular. Numerous
interviews by the authors with natives of Iran of various ethnic origins in Iran, the U.S.A, Sweden, and
Turkey between 2005 and 2014.
66
Jean-Christophe Peuch, “Iran: Cartoon Protests Point To Growing Frustration Among Azeris,“ Radio Free
Europe, May 31, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1068797.html.
67
The motto of SANAM reads “Long Live Independent Azerbaijan with Tebriz at its capital city!”
68
Authors’ numerous discussion with Iranians and Iranian Azerbaijanis in Iran, U.S. and Europe, 2010-2014.