Souleimanov & Kraus
38
the South Azerbaijan National Revival Organization, established in 1995 (SANRO,
Güney Azərbaycan Milli Dirçəliş Təşkilatı); the South Azerbaijan National Liberation
Front, established in 2012 (SANLF, Güney Azərbacan Milli Azadlıq Cəbhəsi), the South
Azerbaijan Independence Party, established in 2006 (Güney Azərbaycan İstiqlal
Partiyası), and others. Similar to SANAM, which remains the predominant and
most renowned group representing Iranian Azerbaijanis led by an authoritative
leader, these loose organizations, usually consisting of several activists and always
based outside the Islamic Republic, have advocated for the ethnolinguistic
emancipation of their ethnic kin in Iran. These organizations, too, have been led by
exiled or diaspora-based Iranian Azerbaijanis without backing from the
Azerbaijani or Turkish authorities. Moreover, their agenda has been more explicit
about unequivocal independence or unification with the Azerbaijani Republic than
in the case of SANAM.
While these groups have often cooperated – for instance, to draw attention to the
ethnolinguistic discrimination of Iranian Azerbaijanis or to the fate of political
prisoners from among Iranian Azerbaijanis in Iran – they have also competed with
one another to be considered the major representatives of Iranian Azerbaijanis and
their interests abroad.
77
These revivalist groups have sought to command
maximum impact on the political preferences of Iranian Azerbaijanis, using Günaz
TV as the main media outlet to reach out particularly to Turkey and Western-based
Iranian Azerbaijanis as a first step to penetrating Iran’s Azerbaijani community. In
one way or another, these organizations have attempted to pave the way for a
potent separatist movement in Iran’s Azerbaijani provinces that would either lead
to the creation of an independent Southern Azerbaijan or its unification with
Azerbaijan and Turkey. To facilitate this ambitious process, the leaders of the South
Azerbaijani independence organizations have appealed to Western-exiled
representatives of Iran’s other “oppressed” ethnic communities – Arabs, Kurds,
Balochs – to coordinate their efforts and, should circumstances allow, also gain
support from key Western nations.
78
Little is known about the actual effect of these groups’ activities on Iranian
Azerbaijanis. However imperfect, our fieldwork in Iran’s Azerbaijani cities implies
77
Zuber Hewrami, “Azeri Movement Argues for Independence from Iran,“ Rudaw, October 1, 2014,
http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iran/10012014.
78
Ibid. It is also likely, given the statements of the representatives of these groups, that they, too, have
sought to establish contacts with – and receive financial support from Western, Turkish, or Azerbaijani
authorities to promote their goals.
Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution
39
that this effect has been minimal so far. With the exception of Chehregani and
SANAM, few had ever heard of any of these groups. Günaz TV appears to be the
single source of information about these groups in Iranian Azerbaijan. This TV
station – blocked by Iranian authorities, but still accessible in Iran through the
internet when Virtual Private Networks (VPNSs) are used – seems to be popular
with part of the Iranian Azerbaijani urban youth in Tebriz, Ardabil, and elsewhere.
But most Iranian Azerbaijanis appear to lack regular access to it, which has left
them unexposed to the rhetoric of these groups.
In any case, SANAM and competing revivalist groups have not been able to create
any underground Azerbaijani movement within Iran that would be capable of
organizing effectively, recruiting a large number of members, and carrying out any
kind of activity. Although there is a general familiarity with SANAM in the bigger
cities of Iranian Azerbaijan, and locals believe that its cells – or rather sympathizers
– do exist there, people in rural areas do not generally know much about this
movement. SANAM has also based a big deal of its “popularity on its hardline
stance with respect to the Kurdish minority that is primarily found in the Western
Azerbaijan province.
79
Most of Iran’s Azerbaijanis, however, are not affected by any
of the movement’s activities and do not perceive it as a platform for a real solution
to their problems or desires for autonomy, actual independence, or unification with
the Azerbaijani Republic or Turkey. SANAM, let alone other revivalist groups, are
therefore virtually incapable of reaching out to Iran-based Azerbaijanis. Members
of the younger generation are much more inclined to seek articulation of their
political opinions through student organizations, demonstrations, or the soccer
subculture.
Having said this, we believe that the ethnic emancipation of Iranian Azerbaijanis
has evolved unaffected by concerted efforts from abroad. As is illustrated in this
monograph, it has been a matter of the region’s internal dynamics shaped by the
rise of ethnic nationalism in Iran, and influenced by external developments, such
as the emergence of independent Azerbaijan to the north of the Araxes, exposure
to Turkish TV, and so on
79
In fact, Azerbaijani nationalism is often directed against not only Persians, but also – and sometimes
primarily – against Kurds. In the past, SANAM have stated several times that if problems arise, it would be
necessary to limit the birthrate of the Kurds, restrict their immigration, or even expel them from Azerbaijani
territory, thereby creating an ethnically homogenous Azerbaijani-dominated territory. These nationalist
appeals supported by SANAM have often focused on the Kurds, the poorest segments of the regional
population, as being primitive, aggressive, and barbarian.