Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution
21
Shariatmadari’s resignation and his appeal to the demonstrators to go home.
31
Demonstrators supporting Shariatmadari – and opposing Khomeini – also
frequently called for autonomy in Iranian Azerbaijan.
32
As Brenda Shaffer has
observed, “each time the central control over freedom of expression in Iran has
diminished, for example, during the period of Islamic Revolution, Azerbaijanis
amplified their expressions of Azerbaijani identity and their demands for
expanded cultural and language rights.”
33
But whereas outright separatism was
voiced among the Arab, Turkmen, Baloch, and Kurdish minorities, the notion of
separation from Iran remained anathema among Azerbaijanis. The Azerbaijani
population remained loyal to Iran during the great Kurdish rebellion from 1980 to
1983, and during the bloody Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988. To this day, the suffering
and hardships of that war binds many Persians and Azerbaijanis together.
34
31
It is not without interest that in 1963 it was Shariatmadari who actually saved Khomeini’s life by
raising him to the status of a marja (a cleric of high authority who could not be executed according to
the Iranian constitution). In part for this reason, Khomeini was sent into exile by the shah’s regime for
his “subversive activities” rather than executed.
32
See, for example, a period news report broadcast on American television by NBC News from Tabriz
in January 1980. “NBC: Turkish People Protest Against Khomeini – 1980 – Tabriz, Iranian
Azerbaijan,” Youtube, October 8, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gx1ldPE-W9A.
33
Brenda Shaffer, Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2002), 5.
34
Interviews of Josef Kraus and Emil Souleimanov with locals on both sides of Azerbaijan-Iran border.
22
The Current Situation in Iranian Azerbaijan
Since the beginning of the 2000s, in spite of all of the restrictions imposed by the
Iranian authorities, the Azerbaijanis have been holding almost regular mass
processions at their national symbols – Mount Sabalan and the fortress Bazz. At
these processions, separatist slogans appear, as do pan-Turkic symbols and the
illegal flag of South Azerbaijan, which is visually similar to the flag of the Republic
of Azerbaijan.
35
Besides increasingly frequent clashes between soccer fans of Azerbaijani and
Persian origin, anonymous posters have begun appearing that call for instruction
in the Turkish language, as well as the flags of Azerbaijan and Turkey hung
overnight in conspicuous places. In response, police and militia units remove these
flags immediately. The Iranian regime has imposed a total embargo on information
about activities of this kind, and as a consequence, the majority Persian population
often live under illusions foisted on them by official government propaganda.
Between 2009 and 2014, field research conducted by the authors in Iranian
Azerbaijan found that in Tabriz, there is nearly open talk of the need for the
federalization of Iran and for the creation of Azerbaijani autonomy, and from time
to time one even hears slogans about the need for Azerbaijan to split away from
Iran. Taking into consideration the established narrative of the full integration of
the Azerbaijanis into Iranian society and the permanent threat of reprisals, one may
assume that the mood is one of heightened tension. Unlike the situation twenty
years ago, when one would scarcely have heard a Turkic language spoken openly
in Tabriz – or ten years ago, when hardly half of the population spoke Turkic in
public – now everyone speaks Azerbaijani in public and listens exclusively to
Azerbaijani or Turkish music. This does not only apply to Tabriz, but also to
Tehran. Azerbaijanis jokingly call Tehran the world’s second largest Turkish city
after Istanbul, because the Iranian capital is a magnet for immigrants, many of
whom are of Azerbaijani origin. The Azerbaijani language can easily be used
35
For a depiction of the flag of South Azerbaijan, see “Tarihte ve Günümüzde Türk Bayrakları. Güney
Azerbaycan,” November 11, 2006, http://turkbayraklari.blogcu.com/guney-azerbaycan/705509.
Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution
23
instead of Persian around the city, because Azerbaijani is the native tongue of many
people, while many Persians have at least a passive knowledge of Azerbaijani.
Most inhabitants of Tehran would like to visit Turkey, and are familiar with it
thanks to satellite broadcasts and very popular Turkish series and telenovelas.
Questions of nationality are gradually becoming important policy matters in Iran.
During the campaign for the Iranian presidential election in May and June of 2013,
the conservative candidate Mohsen Rezaee publicly declared his idea for the
economic federalization of the country based on the individual provinces.
36
The
goal of this idea, which he had already introduced a year earlier in his book
Economic Federalism, is to improve the country’s economy, with less redistribution
at the central level, and with greater authority and freedom for the provincial
governments of the federation to decide on the economic direction and
development within their own territories. In spite of the predominant emphasis on
economic matters, the idea of federalization has caught on mainly among
nationalistic activists, who see in it an opportunity for the creation of nationality-
based autonomous territories. In the context of the election campaign, Rezaee’s
remarks can be viewed as a targeted attempt to woo voters from the periphery and
the Azerbaijanis, Kurds, and Balochs in particular. He succeeded in this to a certain
extent, because he began to be discussed as a possible candidate who would help
the minorities achieve greater emancipation. Yet everything changed with the
dramatic ascent of Hassan Rouhani, who won easily in the first round. Rezaee also
received most of his votes in regions inhabited by minorities, especially in the Arab,
Kurdish, and Lur areas in the west of the country, but also in Iranian Azerbaijan.
37
It remains unclear to what extent this was a result of his ideas on federalism.
In sum, an emancipatory phase of Azerbaijani nationalism appears to be underway
at present, with the parallel emergence and development of armed resistance
forces, although by all indications at a very early stage, and their future and ability
(and willingness) to act is uncertain. Judging only from the difficulties involved
with a nationalistic campaign, it is apparent that the nationalist groups of Iranian
Azerbaijan must have broad support. In view of the repressive nature of the Iranian
36
“Mohsen Rezae’s Emphasis on Economic Federalism”, Asr Iran, May 7, 2013,
http://www.asriran.com/fa/news/269458.
37
Ministry of Interior of Iran, “The Results of Presidential Election,” 2013, http://result-
p.moi.ir/Portal/Home/default.aspx.
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