Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution
19
its population to Turkey and to Caucasian Azerbaijan, and the sheer size of the
ethnic Azerbaijani population represented a potential challenge to the country’s
integrity. From the beginning, the Pahlavi Dynasty exerted great efforts to build a
centralized state, and having experienced the de facto secession of Azerbaijan and
Kurdistan, it focused considerable attention on this key region.
At the same time, Iran’s modern-thinking elites worked incessantly to push Shiite
Islam into the background, instead emphasizing Persian nationalism. Islam was
treated as an alien element ‘imported’ by the Arabs and imposed on the country in
spite of considerable opposition, and the regime instead identified with the pre-
Islamic traditions of the ancient Persian empires of the Achaemenids, Sasanians,
and Parthians.
23
The Persians were regarded as a state-forming nationality, and the
regime adopted a policy to assimilate its ethnic minorities. Instruction, publishing,
and media in non-Persian languages were banned.
24
The Azerbaijanis played a
special role as the largest ethnic minority, and Iran’s Azerbaijani provinces were
among the first in the country where mandatory school attendance (in Persian, of
course) was implemented. Taqi Arani, a native of Tabriz and an important leftist
intellectual, explained in 1924 that mandatory school attendance “must be secured
in Azerbaijan whatever the cost”, emphasizing its political importance.
25
He also
called for the elimination of the Azerbaijani Turkic language, asserting that it had
been foisted on the people by “Mongol invaders,” whereas the region had been the
birthplace of Zoroaster and the cradle of the Iranian Aryans.
26
Indeed, Iranian
Azerbaijani elites themselves often supported assimilation
.
27
In this way, they
the uprisings was, of course, to strengthen their own economic and political autonomy, but their
motivation was not nationalistic.
23
The series of reforms already being carried out during the interwar period was notably reminiscent
of the Kemalist reforms in neighboring Turkey, whether involving relations with the clerics, the
emancipation of women, or efforts to consolidate power in Tehran by the maximum centralization of
the country.
24
This applied especially to the ethnic groups of the Muslim faith in compact settlements on the
country’s periphery, an environment from which one could expect separatism – if only in an
embryonic form. These restrictions did not apply to the ethnic minorities of the Christian faith that
were concentrated mainly in urban locations, such as the Armenians in Tehran, Esfahan, and Tabriz.
25
Taqi Arani, “Azarbaijan ya yek mas‘ale-ye hayati va mamati-ye Iran,“ [Azerbaijan as a Vital
Problem in Iran] Farangestan, no. 1, September (1924): 254.
26
Arani, “Azarbaijan ya yek mas‘ale-ye hayati va mamati-ye Iran,“ 247-48.
27
Ahmad Kasravi, Azari, ya zaban-e bastan-e Azarbaijan, [Azeri, or the ancient language of
Azerbaijan] (Bethesda, Maryland: Ibex Publishers, 1993).
Souleimanov & Kraus
20
helped ingrain the image of the Azerbaijanis as pureblooded but linguistically
Turkified Aryans.
28
The economic policies of the shahs focused on building industry and infrastructure
in the Persian-dominated central areas of the country, while the ethnic periphery
was deliberately neglected. As a consequence, the standard of living in central Iran
became incomparably higher than in the periphery. These economic policies
influenced migration and subsequent assimilation of minorities, especially the
Azerbaijanis, in the 1960s and 1970s.
29
Yet simultaneously, Azerbaijani self-confidence was on the rise in this period, as
was tolerance on the part of the ruling dynasty towards Azerbaijani demands. This
was a result of the marriage of Mohammad Reza to Farah Diba in late 1959.
Although born in Tehran, Farah Diba repeatedly emphasized her Azerbaijani
ancestry and identity, and appeared to view her marriage to the Shah of Iran as
perfect proof of the Persian-Azerbaijani union that joined the two largest
nationalities of modern Iran.
30
More significant changes began to take place following the establishment of the
Islamic Republic. The emphasis of state ideology now shifted from Persian ethno-
nationalism to religious solidarity. For a certain segment of Azerbaijani
intellectuals, the revolution – and the brief openness it generated before the Islamic
character of the emerging regime was sealed – also resurrected hopes for the
federalization of Iran. Manifestations in favor of federalization were seen in several
Azerbaijani cities, and especially in Tabriz. But they could not compete with the
demonstrations held in support of the ethnically Azerbaijani cleric and local native,
Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari. That liberal ayatollah rejected Khomeini’s
conception of the “rule of clerics” as being incompatible with Islam, and
condemned the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran. Shariatmadari was
placed under house arrest, and Iranian military units reappeared on the streets and
squares of the Azerbaijani metropolis. Bloodshed was prevented only by
28
Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982),
388-418.
29
Ali Madanipour, Tehran: The Making of a Metropolis (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1998).
30
Farah Pahlavi, Memoirs (Prague: Argo, 2004).