Kulturkampf
(roughly, ‘struggle for culture’
against what was seen as superstition). A combination of factors led Bismarck to
wage a miscalculated campaign pitting the state against the Catholic church. In
1870 the First Vatican Council had pronounced the doctrine of papal infallibility.
Dissensions among German Catholics led to an initial involvement of the state
with church affairs; but extraneous political considerations soon exacerbated the
situation. The Catholic Centre party, which had been formed in December 1870
to protect Catholic interests in the predominantly Protestant ‘small Germany’
once Austria was excluded, appeared to Bismarck to be protecting a range of
opponents of the Empire. Its support of the Pope bolstered the view that the
Centre party’s primary loyalties did not lie with Germany. Moreover, activities
of the Catholic church in Poland appeared to be strengthening Polish nationalism
and inflaming an unstable situation in the eastern territories of the Empire.
Claiming that external enemies were being aided by an ‘enemy within’,
Bismarck launched a sustained and wide-ranging attack on Catholicism.
Between 1871 and 1876 there were measures to bring the training and
appointment of clergy, and clerical education, under greater state control, and to
prohibit the activities of Jesuits in Germany. In Prussia many priests and bishops
who resisted the anti-Catholic legislation were imprisoned or expelled. The
Centre party ironically consolidated its support as a result of these attacks on
Catholicism, doubling its popular vote in 1874. With a few exceptions (such as
Eduard Lasker), liberals ignored such liberal principles as freedom of thought
and supported Bismarck’s anti-Catholic policies. But by the later 1870s, with the
switch to more conservative protectionist economic policies, it suited Bismarck
to break his ties with the liberals. With the Catholic Centre party by now
numerically strong in the Reichstag, Bismarck sought a rapprochement with the
Catholic leader Windthorst; and by 1879 the Kulturkampf had come to an end. It
was a curious episode which achieved very little from any point of view, other
than the consolidation of the Centre party, which was to be a major and relatively
stable element in German politics for many decades (and, in altered and non-
denominational form, to preside in the shape of the CDU over the founding
decades of post-war West Germany).
The new conservatism of the 1880s was accompanied by a double-pronged
strategy in relation to socialism and the working class. After the 1875 Gotha
congress, the unified German Social Democratic Party had been growing in
strength. It still remained small in numbers, but it was increasingly viewed as a
threat by Bismarck, who considered socialists to be among the ‘enemies of the
Empire’ (
Reichsfeinde
). In 1878, after two attempts on the emperor’s life (which
had nothing to do with the SPD), Bismarck succeeded in pushing an anti-
socialist law through a (re-elected) Reichstag. This banned socialist meetings,
organisations and associations, newspapers and periodicals. The Reichstag
refused, however, to ban those of its own members who constituted the
parliamentary representation of the SPD. This anti-socialist legislation (passed
for three years at a time) was renewed at intervals until Bismarck’s departure
from politics in 1890. Since SPD deputies were still permitted to take their seats
in parliament, one unintended consequence of the anti-socialist law was to turn
German socialism into a very parliament-orientated phenomenon, with major
concentration on winning votes and making parliamentary speeches. While thus
essentially moderate in practice, German socialists sounded rather revolutionary
in theory, since it was difficult to continue in the Lassallean tradition of
assenting to a strong state, once the latter denied socialism its right to existence.
Yet at the same time as the socialists were being politically persecuted, quite
progressive social insurance legislation was being enacted. Bismarck’s social
insurance plans were announced in a speech by the emperor in 1881. Sickness
Insurance was introduced in 1883, Accident Insurance in 1884, and Old Age and
Disability Insurance in 1889. These welfare measures were not purely the result
of machiavellian considerations or bread-and-circuses policies on the part of
Bismarck. The depression which had started in the 1870s led to very real
material distress, and growing disparities between rich and poor, which gave
cause for concern to many members of German society in addition to socialists.
The Christian Social Movement, for example (founded by the right-wing and
rabidly anti-semitic Protestant pastor Adolf Stöcker), as well as Catholic
charitable activities, provided added impetus for the measures. Thus while
suppressing the political activities of the working class with one hand, Bismarck
appeared to be buying them off through welfare provisions with the other. Social
Democrats were themselves aware of this, and uncertain about how best to
respond. Splits between those minded to accept economic improvements in a
piecemeal fashion in the here and now, and those insisting on the need for radical
transformation of the whole system, were to continue and become exacerbated in
subsequent years.
Bismarck’s foreign policy was essentially based on the development of a
complex, but cautious, system of multiple alliances with other European powers.
His aim was to secure Germany’s European position without entering into
another war. The main potential enemy – fear of whom was perhaps unduly
exaggerated by Bismarck – was France. Initially Bismarck sought an alliance
between the three conservative powers of Germany, Austria, and Russia (the
‘Three Emperors’ Alliance’ of 1881, renewed for a further three years in 1884),
while cultivating friendship with Britain. These arrangements were made more
difficult by the rivalries and antagonisms between Austria and Russia, who had
fundamental differences over south-eastern Europe. Bismarck’s self-appointed
role of disinterested ‘honest broker’ became increasingly difficult to sustain.
Following the 1878 Congress of Berlin – which coincided with the shift to
conservatism on the domestic front, with tariffs against the import of Russian
grain an obvious irritant to Russia – Bismarck came to cultivate closer
relationships with Austria, forming the Dual Alliance in 1879. Three years later
this was expanded into a Triple Alliance including Italy. This did not entirely
succeed in reorienting Italy’s interests, while at the same time German domestic
economic policies of the 1880s made England appear more of a rival. By the
later 1880s, realignments were underway again, with the renewed threat of
potential war with France suggesting the necessity of averting an alliance
between France and Russia by once again improving relations with the latter. In
1887, Bismarck secured the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, although the Three
Emperors’ Alliance between Germany, Austria and Russia was not renewed.
This in effect entailed the impossible: the reconciliation of mutually
irreconcilable Russian and Austrian interests in the Balkans. In 1890, under a
new emperor, the Reinsurance Treaty was not renewed. Bismarck’s complex
juggling act in Europe was then replaced by a more aggressive, expansionist and
imperialist foreign policy which culminated eventually in the First World War.
Whether the tensions and stresses involved in Bismarck’s system could ever
have been sustained must remain a moot point.
In March 1888, Emperor William I died at the age of ninety-one. His son,
Frederick III, who succeeded him, died in June of the same year, of cancer of the
throat. He was in turn succeeded by his son, William II, then aged twenty-nine.
Bismarck had been facing mounting problems in the course of the 1880s, and
had even considered the possibility of overthrowing the constitution he had
himself designed. But instead of altering the constitution, Bismarck found that
two particular features of it helped to bring about his downfall. One was the
special relationship between chancellor and emperor, and the considerable
powers of the latter; the second was the power of the army. The new young
emperor had social ideas and political aspirations at odds with those of the
ageing Bismarck. He was, for example, determined to allow the Reinsurance
Treaty with Russia to lapse. He also vehemently disagreed with Bismarck’s plan
to engineer a constitutional crisis over a planned tightening-up of the anti-
socialist legislation, which would enable Bismarck to introduce constitutional
reforms, by force if necessary. The army – which was essential to the latter
strategy – refused to support Bismarck’s plans, and urged William II to dismiss
the eminent chancellor. In 1890, at the age of seventy-five, Bismarck offered his
resignation. In contrast to previous occasions, when the threat of resignation had
gained Bismarck his own way, the new emperor saw the offer not as a threat but
an opportunity. William II was only too pleased to have Bismarck depart his
post. In the symbolic view of a widely reprinted cartoon, the ageing pilot was
dropped from the German ship.
Bismarck left a highly ambiguous legacy for Germany. On the one hand, he
had masterminded the unification of a Prussia-dominated, small-German,
national state: a state which was to prove a powerful economic and political
force in European and world affairs. On the other hand, the state which he had
designed had authoritarian features and was riddled with political and social
tensions. These were to become increasingly evident in the age of imperialism
after Bismarck’s fall.
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