16
Yuri Matsievsky
Hence, there were none and there are still no reasons to claim that at the end of 2004 the
dissolution of the state took place in Ukraine.
2. Change of authority was
carried in non-violent fashion;
3. Events of the end of 2004 in Ukraine even though they were extraordinary with
the repeated voting in the second round of elections, were never beyond the frame of the
legal field;
4. During the two years after the change of authority there weren’t any deep changes
either in the system of authority, or in the social structure of society testifying in general
to the preservation of the current regime in the state.
5. At the beginning of 2006 a political reform that changed parities of powers in the
functions of the political system main institutions in favor of parliament and the cabinet
of ministers was started. There were also certain changes in some social and political insti-
tutions. Though these changes are not carried out systematically and are accompanied by
the strengthening of political confrontation and crises, they are a consequence of the po-
litical compromise reached December 8th, 2004. Thus, the political crisis was overcome
by peaceful means by 2004.
Events in Ukraine could not be called a putsch, a revolt or a coup d’état. However, it
leads to the question how one shall define them? I suggest that we look at the specified
events through the prism of “transitology”. In this sphere of political research the main at-
tention is given to the mechanics of the process of political regime transformation. Tran-
sitology identifies certain types of political transformation: reform, revolution, coup d’état
and transition. If revolution is a violent change of operating institutions then transition
(transit) is a type of political transformation characterized by the change of institutions
without the infringement of legal norms. Reform and coup d’état do not satisfy the given
requirements either.
Transition is considered to be a long process that consists of several stages [30].
Changes begin with the liberalization of the old regime characterized by the attempts
of authorities to preserve the rest of legitimacy by expanding political competition. Next
stage is characterized by the deepening of democratic opposition demands and by the
attempt of authorities to constrain the democratic movement through advances, threats,
concessions, negotiations and compromises with the opposition.
If a democratic opposition comes to power then there are reasons to speak about
the beginning of the deciding third stage of public transformations with such features as
changes
in political,
economic, legal and other subsystems of society.
Reform progressive character and inevitability give a chance to move to the last,
fourth stage of transformations which should end with the strengthening of democratic
institutions, formation of civil type political culture and market economy. Movement from
the consolidated authoritarianism to the consolidated democracy can last from 9-10 up
to 30 and more years [31]. Such duration of transition can be explained by a number of
factors which in some countries can accelerate, and in other countries slow down the
processes of changes.
17
“Orange Revolution” in Ukraine: Transitological Interpretation
It is better to explain the events in Ukraine through the prism of transit which, in
my opinion, began at the end of the 80s of the XXth century continuing for another
5-15 years. Transition in Ukraine is not similar to other well-known examples of demo-
cratic transformations. In Ukraine there was a nonviolent rotation of imperious elites with
mass participation of the population during presidential election campaign. However, the
change of the elites in authority did not lead to the change
of the political regime
*
.
The political regime formed in Ukraine from 1994 till 2004 was a symbiosis of neo-
patrimonial authoritarian rule of President L. Kuchma and domination of clan oligarchy.
The political cycle that lasted 13 years, came to an end. At the beginning of 2005 we re-
turned to the initial point of 1991, though on a totally different level.
The political process in Ukraine never went beyond the limits of the legal field though
was very close to it. Elections ended, both extraordinary and legitimate at the same time.
The political crisis caused by infringements of electoral law and mass protest actions, was
also solved with a compromise.
Institutions in Ukraine started to change at the beginning of 2005. These changes may
include: struggle against corruption which has got a systematic character in Ukraine and is
considered to be an institute typical of authoritarian and transitive societies [32]; realiza-
tion of the political reform which provides for changes in powers of the main branches of
power; preparation of an administrative-territorial reform. These reforms, provided they
are successfully implemented, all together, may affect the change of the whole political
system.
Hence, presidential elections, accompanied by mass participation of citizens in politi-
cal protest actions lay the foundation for the beginning of the third stage of transition.
It shall be pointed out that for two years after the events of “the Orange Revolution”
democratic changes in Ukraine did not acquire an irreversible character. As the study of
consequences of presidential elections in 2004 is not the task of the given publication, I
shall deal only with the list of authors who substantiate such cautions with more detail
[33].
Ukrainian Transition in a Comparative Context
Collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe at the end of the 80s of the XXth
century was non-violent due to the rise of mass political strikes and protest actions which
became the consequence of the communist regimes system crisis. Peculiar features of cri-
sis include the inability of the governments to effectively cooperate with the opposition,
economic decline and loss of communist regime legitimacy.
Collapse of authoritarian regimes in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary occurred
in each country in its own way in the presence of internal or external catalysts, namely, a
sharp
economic crisis, interference in internal
affairs from the outside, etc.
* This thesis will be studied in more detail in a separate research paper.