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advance in summer 2014.
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To ensure further measures, intelligence, findings and evidence
regarding transnational ties and connections of local smugglers should be shared with other
jurisdictions. This could involve a wide range of actors from both the government and private
sectors.
2.3 KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM
Jurisdictions should make use of UNSCRs 2133 (2014), 2170 (2014), 2161 (2014) and 2199 (2015)
in the scope of countering the financing of ISIL. In order to adhere to these UNSC resolutions
dealing with ransom payments, financial institutions should avoid processing attempted transfers
through the international financial system of ransom payments to listed individuals and entities.
In relation to insurance companies, the 16
th
report of the Monitoring Team highlights the value of
sanctions exclusions clauses in kidnapping and ransom policies. Such clauses
are generally worded
very broadly and provide that the insurer is not liable for paying any claim that would expose the
insurer to a breach of relevant sanctions obligations, including United Nations sanctions.
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The
Monitoring Team recommended that the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee suggest that Member
States encourage insurance companies in their jurisdictions to incorporate such clauses into
kidnap and ransom insurance policies in accordance with their national legislation.
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Case Study 14:
Criminalizing Ransom Payments
The United Kingdom’s (UK) Terrorism Act 2000 prohibits the provision of funds to terrorists under
any circumstances (s15). It also prohibits the entrance into an arrangement as a result of which
funds may be made available to terrorist (s17). The threshold – reasonable cause to suspect – is
intentionally low. These offences have extra territorial effect.
However, two recent cases highlighted a lack of clarity in the law as it related to insurance
payments, meaning there was potential for UK insurance/reinsurance firms to find themselves in a
position where they are called upon to reimburse to insured parties for payments, (such as ransom
payments), where they know or have reasonable cause to suspect that the funds have gone to
terrorists. Existing UK terrorist finance legislation, while comprehensive, is not explicit on whether
or not such reimbursements were prohibited in law. This clearly went against the UK Government’s
clear stance on kidnap for ransom.
To put beyond doubt that such reimbursements are illegal, the UK Government introduced a
measure in the CT and Security Bill,
currently before Parliament, making it an offence for insurers
(or reinsurers) to reimburse a payment which they know or have reasonable cause to suspect has
been made in response to a terrorist demand.
Source: United Kingdom
82
Hurriyet Daily News (2014).
83
United Nations (27 Oct. 2014).
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Id.
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2015
2.4 FUNDRAISING THROUGH MODERN COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
This report has shown that in terms of its external donor networks, ISIL is beginning to draw
material support from grass root-level individual contributors rather than soliciting funds from
deep pocket donor networks. The examples in this report emphasise how ISIL has used social media
platforms to secure individual-level acts of material support which are delivered through wire
transfers, bank transactions, or cash couriers. Emerging technological advancements have created
novel virtual pathways to solicit and transfer funds instantaneously to any location. These expanded
internet-based pathways provide more anonymity and greater opportunity for fraud and the
obscuring both the source and recipient of the funds. To effectively combat this approach,
international focus must shift to also include grass root funding by lessening the opportunities for
ordinary citizens to contribute to ISIL’s campaign.
Case Study 15:
As of January 2015, the Saudi competent authorities addressed individuals and entities calling for
donations for the Syrian people over the internet. Those calls were through social media, including
Twitter, and included local and international banking accounts the donors could transfer to.
The authorities imposed temporary attachments which resulted in a “preventive temporary freeze”
on local bank accounts and prevents international transfers. A total of 61 local bank accounts have
been identified and blocked. The account holders include nine different nationalities. After
investigation, 16 out of those accounts have been released. On the other hand, 29 foreign bank
accounts in four countries and representing 20 beneficiaries have also been identified and measures
have been taken to prevent any wire transfer from Saudi banks to those accounts.
Source: Saudi Arabia
2.5 MATERIAL SUPPORT AND FTFS
Greater efforts should be taken to prevent the flow of foreign terrorist fighters travelling to the
conflict zones to join terrorist groups. Some jurisdictions have placed travel bans on their nationals
who have supported, or are associated with, ISIL, and some jurisdictions have indicated they would
strip the nationality of those citizens. As noted in section II.4 of the report more work is needed to
develop red-flags to better identify the funding mechanisms FTFs utilize which should involve
greater domestic cooperation among AML/CFT bodies and other authorities. Cooperative efforts
could include identifying and freezing of FTF’s bank accounts, annulment of their debit/credit cards
and criminalizing fund transfers for their use, particularly after their departure from their countries.
3. PREVENTING ISIL FROM ABUSING RELEVANT SECTORS
3.1 FINANCIAL SECTOR
In an attempt to mitigate potential losses, regional bank branches have started to enact failsafe
manoeuvers. Large international banking groups have begun to relocate staff in their regional
branches from areas around ISIL-held territory to safer locations both within and outside of Iraq.
These groups have advised their major multinational clients to minimize assets held in Iraq, and