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3.2 Cultural Artefacts ............................................................................................................................. 37
4. Steps to Limit Humanitarian Consequences for Population .................................................................. 38
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 40
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................. 41
FINANCING OF THE TERRORIST ORGANISATION ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL)
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ACRONYMS
ABM
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis
AML/CFT
Anti-Money Laundering / Countering the Financing of Terrorism
ANF
Al-Nusrah Front
AQ
Al-Qaida
AQI
Al-Qaida in Iraq
EFTs
Electronic Funds Transfers
FATF
Financial Action Task Force
FIU
Financial intelligence units
FTFs
Foreign Terrorist Fighters
IRS-CI
IRS-Criminal Investigation
ISIL
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
KFR
Kidnapping for Ransom
KRG
Kurdistan Regional Government
MVTS
Money or value transfer services
NPO
Non-Profit Organisation
R.
Recommendation
TF
Terrorist Financing
UN
United Nations
UNODC
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCR
United Nations Security Council Resolution
USD
US Dollars
FINANCING OF THE TERRORIST ORGANISATION ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL)
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The mandate of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was expanded in 2001 to address the
funding of terrorists acts and terrorist organisations. Since that time, combatting terrorist financing
(TF) has been a very significant challenge. Important work was done in 2008 to identify a wide
variety of TF methods terrorists use to raise, move and use funds. That study addressed the
terrorist requirement for funds to include direct costs associated with specific operations and
broader organisational costs to maintain infrastructure and promote ideology for the terrorist
organisation.
Given the rapid development of the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
there is a need to understand those funding requirements and associated TF risk. This study
represents a snapshot of the revenue sources and financial activities of ISIL been identified to date.
However, gaps remain and more work is needed to develop the full picture of ISIL’s financial
activities and to identify the most effective countermeasures to prevent ISIL from using
accumulated funds and disrupting sources of funding. ISIL financing is a constantly changing
picture and a very difficult and complicated area to address given the operational situation on the
ground. It should be emphasized that terrorism and those who support terrorism can never be
associated with any religion, nationality, civilisation or ethnic group.
ISIL represents a new form of terrorist organisation where funding is central and critical to its
activities. This report identifies ISIL’s primary sources of revenue which are mainly derived from
illicit proceeds from its occupation of territory. These sources include bank looting and extortion,
control of oil fields and refineries and robbery of economic assets. Other sources include the donors
who abuse Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs), Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR) and cash smuggling
(areas where FATF has conducted in-depth research), to new and emerging typologies which have
not yet been addressed by the FATF, such as the extortion of goods and cash transiting territory
where ISIL operates and grass-root funding strategies. A number of unique and diverse “case
studies” have been provided by countries which describe how ISIL obtains funding and economic
support as well as describing mechanisms to utilize these funds.
The need for vast funds to meet organisational and governance requirements represents a
vulnerability to ISIL’s infrastructure. In order to maintain its financial management and
expenditures in areas where it operates, ISIL must be able to seize additional territory in order to
exploit resources. It is unclear if ISIL’s revenue collection through the illicit proceeds it earns from
occupation of territory, including extortion and theft, will be sustainable over time. Cutting off these
vast revenue streams is both a challenge and opportunity for the global community to defeat this
terrorist organisation.
While insight into ISIL’s oil-related activities is limited, this report provides a snapshot of ISIL’s
control of gas and oil reservoirs. While this revenue stream was significant after ISIL’s initial
control of numerous oil fields, their ability to efficiently extract oil, refine it and sell petroleum
products have significantly diminished ISIL’s earnings. This is due to coalition
1
air strikes, ISIL’s
1
The Global Coalition to Counter ISIL (“the Coalition”) is comprised so far of more than 60 partners that have
committed themselves to the goals of eliminating the threat posed by ISIL and have already contributed