FINANCING OF THE TERRORIST ORGANISATION ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL)
16
2015
launders stolen crops by obscuring its origin), or by violently acquiring silos and keeping those
previously employed on the payroll to carry out daily business, only now under ISIL control.
30
Since
June 2014, ISIL reportedly took control of an estimated sixteen wheat silos including the largest silo
in Makhmur which houses approximately 8 percent of Iraq’s annual production.
31
As well as obtaining revenue from selling crops, seizing agricultural supplies could also be intended
to intimidate farmers and other Iraqis in ISIL-controlled areas.
32
ISIL has already used its control of
water resources to destroy farmland in southern Iraq, by releasing water held by Fallujah dam.
33
The release destroyed cropland 160 kilometers downstream, leaving millions of people without
water in the cities of Karbala, Najaf and Babil.
34
1.4 OTHER RESOURCE EXTRACTION AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES
Various resource extraction and production facilities that are located in territory where ISIL
currently operates may serve as an additional source of revenue. For example, according to one
public report, ISIL has gained control of the Akashat Phosphate Mine and the Al-Qaim
manufacturing plant, both located in Iraq’s Al-Anbar province and owned by the Iraqi’s State
Company for Phosphate Manufacture which produces both sulfuric acid and phosphoric acid.
35
According to the available estimates and depending on production levels and the ultimate sales
price (which, like crude oil sold by ISIL, could be significantly discounted), ISIL could generate tens,
if not several hundred million USD a year from these facilities.
36
The same public report also notes
that ISIL has control over five major cement plants in Syria and Iraq: Al-Raqqah Guris Cement Plant
located in Raqqa, Syria; and the Al-Fallujah, Kubaisa, and Al-Qaim plants in Iraq. ISIL may also
control several sulfur extraction plants operated by the Mishraq Sulphur State Company in the
Nineveh governorate and the main salt mine of Syria in Al-Tabani (province of Dei res-Zor),
operated by the General Establishment of Geology and Mineral Resources.
37
Unlike crude oil and refined petroleum, for which there are long-established smuggling routes and
local black markets, these other resources and facilities may be more difficult for ISIL to monetize,
and so it may be difficult to estimate exactly how much revenue ISIL can generate from these assets.
1.5 CULTURAL ARTEFACTS
Reports on the smuggling of cultural artefacts by ISIL are limited, given that they are sold on the
black market. ISIL's ability to earn revenue from the illicit sale of antiquities is contingent upon the
presence of antiquities within territory where ISIL operates, knowledge of their existence, and ISIL’s
30
Fick, M. (2014).
31
Id
.
32
Fick, M. and El Dahan, M. (2014).
33
Massih, N. (2014).
34
Id.
35
Brisard, J.C. & Martinez, D. (2014).
36
Id.
37
Id.
FINANCING OF THE TERRORIST ORGANISATION ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL)
2015
17
ability to recognize materials as artefacts and develop some estimation of their value. Although it
might be impossible to show a direct link between the ISIL and the sale of a specific artefact, ISIL
makes money in two ways from antiquities, both through selling looted artefacts and taxing
traffickers moving items through ISIL-held territory.
38
However, the total amount that ISIL is
earning is difficult to estimate, particularly as the activity is taking place across Syria, in the midst of
the conflict, not just in ISIL-held areas.
National Geographic
reports that according to flash drives seized by Iraqi security forces, ISIL and
other illicit groups operating in Syria could have earned as much as tens of millions of USD to date
from antiquities stolen from Syria.
39
ISIL also occupies more than 4 500 archaeological sites, some
of them UNESCO World Heritage sites. According to the same report, 90 percent of the country’s
cultural artefacts are located in war torn areas, which has allowed for large scale looting.
40
More
specifically, the organisation was able to take valuable relics from archaeological dig sites as well as
from al-Nabuk in Syria, with some of the artefacts dating back 8,000 years.
41
1.6 ILLICIT TAXATION OF GOODS AND CASH THAT TRANSIT TERRITORY WHERE ISIL OPERATES
Trade of goods and transfers of cash into and out of ISIL-held territory has been significantly
disrupted due to the weak security environment. However, according to industry contacts and
press reporting, some trade of goods has persisted, as have cash transfers necessary for financing
this trade. ISIL is able to impose levies on all goods transiting territory where it operates. ISIL has
reportedly imposed specific taxes on the movement of goods in parts of Iraq where it operates,
including a road tax of 200 USD in northern Iraq and an 800 USD “customs” tax on trucks entering
Iraq along the Syrian and Jordanian borders.
42
1.7 SALARY PAYMENTS TO IRAQI GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
In addition to ISIL taxing the transit of goods and generating revenue from the sale of oil and
petroleum products, ISIL benefits from the shipment of cash entering into territory where it
operates. The Government of Iraq has taken proactive steps to prevent the transfer of hard
currency to bank branches where ISIL operates. It has also prevented the shipment of salary
payments directly to government employees in ISIL-held territory, opting instead to send the funds
to Kirkuk and elsewhere. However, government employees that remain in territory where ISIL
operates travel to Kirkuk and elsewhere to withdraw their salaries in cash, and return to ISIL-held
territory where their salaries are then taxed by ISIL at rates of up to 50 percent.
43
While there are
significant humanitarian concerns
that need to be addressed, this practice represents a recurring
source of revenue for ISIL. Several US contacts in Iraq have estimated that the value of these salary
38
Frenkel, S. (2014).
39
Pringle, H. (2014).
40
Id.
41
Chulov, M. (2014).
42
Brisard, J.C. & Martinez, D. (2014).
43
Solomon, E. (2014).