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UNIYA OOO AND BELCOURT TRADING COMPANY v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
alcohol within criminal proceedings related to allegedly unlawful operations
by the managers of Uniya, and therefore must have considered it Uniya’s
property (see paragraph 126 above). The courts seemed to depart from the
same assumption and did not dispute Uniya’s standing (see paragraph 150
and 164 above). The argument that Uniya had failed to prove its property
title to the alcohol appeared in the reasoning of the Russian courts quite late
(see the decision of the Ninth District Commercial Court of 5 September
2006, paragraph 174 above). Even after that decision the courts were not
unanimous on the issue of ownership (see paragraph 177 above).
296. Finally, in 2010 the Baltiyskiy District Court reconsidered the issue
and concluded that Uniya was nothing more than a “depositary and agent”
in respect of the second consignment. The Baltiyskiy District Court
reasoned as follows (see paragraphs 178 et seq. above): the property title to
the second consignment was required to have been defined pursuant to the
contract of 3 November 1997 between Uniya and Belcourt, and not its later
amendments. That contract provided that Uniya was acting as depositary
and agent in respect of the alcohol imported by Belcourt into Russia. Under
the 1997 contract Belcourt retained the title to the alcohol until it received
payment for it. Since no payment was received by Belcourt, Uniya did not
become the owner of the alcohol. In addition, the alcohol did not clear
customs and therefore was not in Uniya’s possession.
297. The reasoning of the Baltiyskiy District Court in the 2010
proceedings was seemingly at odds with the position of the Russian
authorities in previous years, when Uniya was implicitly regarded as the
lawful owner of the second consignment. Be that as it may, it was based on
a reasonable assessment of evidence, so the Court is prepared to defer to the
national judge on this point. The Court accepts that at the moment of the
seizure of the second consignment Uniya was not the owner but the
depositary and sales agent in respect of that part of the alcohol. The question
is therefore who the owner was.
298. The Court recalls that when Uniya lost its case, Belcourt brought a
similar tort action under Article 139 in its own name (see paragraph 186
above). Belcourt argued that if Uniya was not the lawful owner of the
alcohol the title remained with Belcourt, and therefore it was entitled to
receive compensation for the unlawful destruction of the alcohol (see
paragraph 118 above). In reply to that argument the Moskovskiy District
Court found that the judgment of the Baltiyskiy District Court rejecting
Uniya’s claims against the State had not established that Belcourt was the
lawful owner of the alcohol (see paragraph 190 above).
299. The findings of the judgment of 19 July 2012 by the Moskovskiy
District Court on the issue of ownership title were inconclusive. The District
Court did not hold directly that the second consignment did not belong to
Belcourt. The judgment of the Moskovskiy District Court in this part was
limited to a finding that the earlier judgments concerning the second
UNIYA OOO AND BELCOURT TRADING COMPANY v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
59
consignment, and in particular the judgment of 30 March 2010 by the
Baltiyskiy District Court, cannot be interpreted as establishing that Belcourt
was the lawful owner of the alcohol. Thus, although Belcourt lost the case,
the question of ownership title to the second consignment remained open. In
such circumstances the Court has to review the situation afresh.
300. The Court observes that from the moment of the seizure of the first
consignment until now nobody else except Uniya or Belcourt tried to seek
damages from the Russian authorities in connection with its seizure and
destruction. Indeed, at some point Uniya made an attempt to sell the alcohol
in the second consignment to a third party – Moscow Wines and Spirits
GMBH (see paragraph 139 above). However, it appears that this agreement
has never been executed, and, in any event, the Government did not claim
that the second consignment belonged to Moscow Wines and Spirits.
301. It was not disputed by the Government that the second consignment
had been imported into Russia under a valid agreement concluded between
Uniya and Belcourt. Whatever the exact role of each company was, it is
clear that Belcourt was the “shipping party” and Uniya the “receiving party”
(see paragraph 9 above). In the judgment of 4 December 2001 by the
Kaliningrad Region Commercial Court (see paragraphs 165 et seq. above)
Belcourt was repeatedly referred to as “seller”, and Uniya as “buyer”. At the
moment of the sale of the second consignment Belcourt exercised the
powers of its owner; Uniya was supposed to pay Belcourt the price which
corresponded to the declared customs value of the whole second
consignment and sell the alcohol to other customers. The 1997 agreement,
on which both the Government and the domestic courts in the last round of
proceedings relied, stipulated that the ownership title to the second
consignment would not pass to Uniya until such time as Uniya paid full
price, which never happened. Even if Belcourt was named “Principal” in the
1997 agreement, at the moment of its signature Belcourt acted as the de
facto owner of the alcohol in the relations with Uniya and with the third
parties in Russia.
302. The Court does not know how Belcourt acquired the title to the
second consignment in the place where it had been purchased, or what
contractual obligations Belcourt might have had in relation to that alcohol.
However, the Court does not need to make a final determination of the
question of ownership under Russian law or any other national law. The
Court’s role is not to define the exact legal title to the contested property
under the domestic law but rather to assess, for the purposes of the case
before it and on the basis of materials and information produced by the
parties, whether that property may be characterised as Belcourt’s
“possessions” within the autonomous meaning of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1. “The issue that needs to be examined is whether the
circumstances of the case, considered as a whole, may be regarded as
having conferred on the applicant title to a substantive interest protected by