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İnsan ve Toplum
This book contains eight separate essays from distinguished
theologians and philoso-
phers and a general introduction into the realism/antirealism debate in the philoso-
phy of religion. The debate revolves around three key issues: the question of God’s
independence from human constructions, the nature of religious truth, and our access
to religious truth. On the one hand, religious realists normally maintain that religious
claims represent truths which are independent of the human mind and to which we
have some means of epistemic access. They also often hold that at least some religious
claims are actually true. On the other hand, religious antirealists
present various con-
trary claims such as the assertions that religious claims are primarily expressive rather
than truly representational; that religious truths are inaccessible to us; that religious
truth is a matter of the satisfaction of internal standards of religious language (or ‘lan-
guage games’); that religious claims are systematically false. As the editors note in the
preface, this debate has seen little sustained exploration compared to its counterpart
in ethics and the philosophy of science, and that there is also yet no general consensus
on how to approach the problem. This book is by no means an attempt to bring about
such a consensus, but presents a firm basis upon which the debate can be advanced.
The essays fall into two categories: Gordon Kaufman, Peter Lipton and Simon Blackburn
provide the opening chapters and the context for the collection, while Alexander
Bird,
John Hare, Graham Oppy and Nick Trakakis, Merold Westphal, and John Webster
explore topics that are central to the debate. A variety of different theoretical posi-
tions are expressed by the contributors, and each touches upon a different area. In the
introduction, the editors list four critical problems raised in the collection that merit
particular attention: (1) The appropriate paradigm(s) for pursuing the realism debate;
(2) The possible lessons from comparable debates in science and ethics; (3) The ways
in which religious realism is distinct
from other kinds of realism; and (4) The relation-
ship between philosophy and theology. This is then followed by a discussion of the
approaches to and arguments of the debate, concentrating on the cognitivist and
non-cognitivist positions in philosophy and their relative strengths when applied to
religious issues. Next, there is an examination of each of the following essays, marking
out the main approaches of each contribution and the contrasting theses they express.
The first essay is written by G. D. Kaufman, who sets out to explore the interconnections
and interdependence of ‘Mystery, God, and Constructivism’. Kaufman avoids analysis of
the general problem
of religion and realism, and instead provides a kind of case study
of the problem as it appears in connection with some of the central claims of Christian
Andrew Moore & Micheal Scott (Eds.), Realism and Religion: Philosophical and Theological Perspectives,
Hampshire and Burlington: Ashgate, 2007, 172 p.
Değerlendiren: Kayhan Ali*
* Dokrora Öğrencisi, Sakarya Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi
197
Değerlendirme / Review
faith concerning the ‘ultimate reality’. The first section of this essay articulates the natu-
ral reasons for awe and mystery that we as human beings experience when thinking
about the universe and our place within it. This is then followed by an examination
of the concept of God as an answer to that natural wonder,
as well as the epistemic
problems that we seem to face when seeking knowledge of Him. Kaufman identifies
God primarily as an imaginative construction or symbol whose contents or meaning
we are rather unable to verify. The findings of this examination are then applied to
theology, which is thus identified as an imaginative and socio-cultural activity. Here
Kaufman notes the changing notions humans have had of God’s nature, where a kind
of reality-testing based on cultural and scientific developments can lead to new activity
and shifts in theology. The next sections look at how such activity could be carried out
and questions whether such activity is able to credibly maintain the traditional idea of
God. Having identified certain aspects of our received concept of God to be difficult
to maintain, Kaufman presents
the central claim of his essay, and offers two substitute
ideas (namely, serendipitous creativity and directional movements) in order to explain,
or rather, correspond with modern and postmodern scientific and historical findings.
In the second essay, Peter Lipton focuses on the cognitive tension between science and
religion, giving special attention to the contradictions between some of the claims of
current science and religious texts. Lipton takes note of two different approaches in the
philosophy of science that may help to manage the tension, namely, adjusting content
and adjusting attitude to facts. From these he chooses the second strategy in order to
deal with the claims of religious texts. This leads to a consideration of Kuhn’s doctrine of
multiple worlds and then the
Immersion Solution as inspired by constructive empiricism
from the philosophy of science. Throughout these discussions Lipton is concerned with
three main things, maintaining a realist position about science, an antirealist position
about religion, while preserving the literal content of religious and scientific claims. This
is done, in part, to maintain the normative, that is, ethical contents of religion despite
the notion that these are not observable or scientifically testable. Lipton’s ultimate
claim in the essay is a resolution of the tension between science and religion inspired
by empirical constructivism that entails substituting faith in supernatural entities and
events with an acceptance of normative values that are to be found in religious texts.
The fourth chapter contains Simon Blackburn’s
contribution, which concerns the
ontology and ontological nature of religious language. He begins with an account
of approaches to ontology in theology and philosophy, looking more specifically at
phenomenology and then, with more positive comment, the work of W. V. Quine, and
David Lewis’s credo argument. He goes on to argue that the credo argument provides
a good way to think about ontology in general, because it leads to a ‘deflation’ of truth
claims that benefits from being immune to postmodernist scepticism this deflation
makes truth
not a matter of metaphysics, but rather locating, collecting, and general-
izing the claims of a theory. In the next two sections Blackburn presents an example
of deflationism in action, specifically, by taking David Lewis’s realism about possible
worlds as a test case. He then considers instances of discourse that may or may not