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any special a priori theological system, and out of an aggregate of
piecemeal judgments as to the value of this and that experience —
judgments in which our general philosophic prejudices, our instincts,
and our common sense are our only guides — decide that on the
whole one type of religion is approved by its fruits, and another type
condemned. “On the whole,” — I fear we shall never escape com-
plicity with that qualification, so dear to your practical man, so
repugnant to your systematizer!
I also fear that as I make this frank confession, I may seem to
some of you to throw our compass overboard, and to adopt caprice
as our pilot. Skepticism or wayward choice, you may think, can
be the only results of such a formless method as I have taken up.
A few remarks in deprecation of such an opinion, and in farther
explanation of the empiricist principles which I profess, may there-
fore appear at this point to be in place.
Abstractly, it would seem illogical to try to measure the worth
of a religion’s fruits in merely human terms of value. How can you
measure their worth without considering whether the God really
exists who is supposed to inspire them? If he really exists, then all
the conduct instituted by men to meet his wants must necessarily
be a reasonable fruit of his religion, — it would be unreasonable
only in case he did not exist. If, for instance, you were to condemn
a religion of human or animal sacrifices by virtue of your subjective
sentiments, and if all the while a deity were really there demand-
ing such sacrifices, you would be making a theoretical mistake by
tacitly assuming that the deity must be non-existent; you would be
setting up a theology of your own as much as if you were a scholastic
philosopher.
To this extent, to the extent of disbelieving peremptorily in cer-
tain types of deity, I frankly confess that we must be theologians.
If disbeliefs can be said to constitute a theology, then the pre-
judices, instincts, and common sense which I chose as our guides
make theological partisans of us whenever they make certain beliefs
abhorrent.
But such common-sense prejudices and instincts are themselves
the fruit of an empirical evolution. Nothing is more striking than
the secular alteration that goes on in the moral and religious tone
of men, as their insight into nature and their social arrangements
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257
progressively develop. After an interval of a few generations the
mental climate proves unfavorable to notions of the deity which at
an earlier date were perfectly satisfactory: the older gods have fallen
below the common secular level, and can no longer be believed
in. To-day a deity who should require bleeding sacrifices to placate
him would be too sanguinary to be taken seriously. Even if powerful
historical credentials were put forward in his favor, we would not
look at them. Once, on the contrary, his cruel appetites were of
themselves credentials. They positively recommended him to men’s
imaginations in ages when such coarse signs of power were respected
and no others could be understood. Such deities then were worshiped
because such fruits were relished.
Doubtless historic accidents always played some later part, but
the original factor in fixing the figure of the gods must always have
been psychological. The deity to whom the prophets, seers, and
devotees who founded the particular cult bore witness was worth
something to them personally. They could use him. He guided their
imagination, warranted their hopes, and controlled their will, —
or else they required him as a safeguard against the demon and a
curber of other people’s crimes. In any case, they chose him for the
value of the fruits he seemed to them to yield. So soon as the fruits
began to seem quite worthless; so soon as they conflicted with indis-
pensable human ideals, or thwarted too extensively other values;
so soon as they appeared childish, contemptible, or immoral when
reflected on, the deity grew discredited, and was erelong neglected
and forgotten. It was in this way that the Greek and Roman
gods ceased to be believed in by educated pagans; it is thus that
we ourselves judge of the Hindu, Buddhist, and Mohammedan
theologies; Protestants have so dealt with the Catholic notions
of deity, and liberal Protestants with older Protestant notions; it
is thus that Chinamen judge of us, and that all of us now living will
be judged by our descendants. When we cease to admire or approve
what the definition of a deity implies, we end by deeming that
deity incredible.
Few historic changes are more curious than these mutations of
theological opinion. The monarchical type of sovereignty was, for
example, so ineradicably planted in the mind of our own forefathers
that a dose of cruelty and arbitrariness in their deity seems posi-
tively to have been required by their imagination. They called the
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cruelty “retributive justice,” and a God without it would certainly
have struck them as not “sovereign” enough. But to-day we abhor
the very notion of eternal suffering inflicted; and that arbitrary
dealing-out of salvation and damnation to selected individuals,
of which Jonathan Edwards could persuade himself that he had not
only a conviction, but a “delightful conviction,” as of a doctrine
“exceeding pleasant, bright, and sweet,” appears to us, if sovereignly
anything, sovereignly irrational and mean. Not only the cruelty,
but the paltriness of character of the gods believed in by earlier
centuries also strikes later centuries with surprise. We shall see
examples of it from the annals of Catholic saintship which make
us rub our Protestant eyes. Ritual worship in general appears to
the modern transcendentalist, as well as to the ultra-puritanic type
of mind, as if addressed to a deity of an almost absurdly childish
character, taking delight in toy-shop furniture, tapers and tinsel,
costume and mumbling and mummery, and finding his “glory”
incomprehensibly enhanced thereby; — just as on the other hand
the formless spaciousness of pantheism appears quite empty to
ritualistic natures, and the gaunt theism of evangelical sects seems
intolerably bald and chalky and bleak. Luther, says Emerson, would
have cut off his right hand rather than nail his theses to the door
at Wittenberg, if he had supposed that they were destined to lead
to the pale negations of Boston Unitarianism.
So far, then, although we are compelled, whatever may be our
pretensions to empiricism, to employ some sort of a standard of
theological probability of our own whenever we assume to estimate
the fruits of other men’s religion, yet this very standard has been
begotten out of the drift of common life. It is the voice of human
experience within us, judging and condemning all gods that stand
athwart the pathway along which it feels itself to be advancing.
Experience, if we take it in the largest sense, is thus the parent of
those disbeliefs which, it was charged, were inconsistent with the
experiential method. The inconsistency, you see, is immaterial, and
the charge may be neglected.
If we pass from disbeliefs to positive beliefs, it seems to me that
there is not even a formal inconsistency to be laid against our
method. The gods we stand by are the gods we need and can use,
the gods whose demands on us are reinforcements of our demands
on ourselves and on one another. What I then propose to do is,
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