THE VALUE OF SAINTLINESS
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briefly stated, to test saintliness by common sense, to use human
standards to help us decide how far the religious life commends
itself as an ideal kind of human activity. If it commends itself, then
any theological beliefs that may inspire it, in so far forth will stand
accredited. If not, then they will be discredited, and all without
reference to anything but human working principles. It is but the
elimination of the humanly unfit, and the survival of the humanly
fittest, applied to religious beliefs; and if we look at history candidly
and without prejudice, we have to admit that no religion has ever
in the long run established or proved itself in any other way. Reli-
gions have approved themselves; they have ministered to sundry
vital needs which they found reigning. When they violated other
needs too strongly, or when other faiths came which served the
same needs better, the first religions were supplanted.
The needs were always many, and the tests were never sharp. So
the reproach of vagueness and subjectivity and “on the whole’-ness,
which can with perfect legitimacy be addressed to the empirical
method as we are forced to use it, is after all a reproach to which the
entire life of man in dealing with these matters is obnoxious. No reli-
gion has ever yet owed its prevalence to “apodictic certainty.” In a
later lecture I will ask whether objective certainty can ever be added
by theological reasoning to a religion that already empirically prevails.
One word, also, about the reproach that in following this sort of
an empirical method we are handing ourselves over to systematic
skepticism.
Since it is impossible to deny secular alterations in our senti-
ments and needs, it would be absurd to affirm that one’s own age of
the world can be beyond correction by the next age. Skepticism
cannot, therefore, be ruled out by any set of thinkers as a possibility
against which their conclusions are secure; and no empiricist ought
to claim exemption from this universal liability. But to admit
one’s liability to correction is one thing, and to embark upon a sea
of wanton doubt is another. Of willfully playing into the hands of
skepticism we cannot be accused. He who acknowledges the imper-
fectness of his instrument, and makes allowance for it in discussing
his observations, is in a much better position for gaining truth than
if he claimed his instrument to be infallible. Or is dogmatic or
scholastic theology less doubted in point of fact for claiming, as it
260THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
does, to be in point of right undoubtable? And if not, what com-
mand over truth would this kind of theology really lose if, instead
of absolute certainty, she only claimed reasonable probability for
her conclusions? If we claim only reasonable probability, it will be
as much as men who love the truth can ever at any given moment
hope to have within their grasp. Pretty surely it will be more than
we could have had, if we were unconscious of our liability to err.
Nevertheless, dogmatism will doubtless continue to condemn us
for this confession. The mere outward form of inalterable certainty
is so precious to some minds that to renounce it explicitly is for
them out of the question. They will claim it even where the facts
most patently pronounce its folly. But the safe thing is surely to
recognize that all the insights of creatures of a day like ourselves
must be provisional. The wisest of critics is an altering being, sub-
ject to the better insight of the morrow, and right at any moment,
only “up to date” and “on the whole.” When larger ranges of truth
open, it is surely best to be able to open ourselves to their recep-
tion, unfettered by our previous pretensions. “Heartily know, when
half-gods go, the gods arrive.”
The fact of diverse judgments about religious phenomena is there-
fore entirely unescapable, whatever may be one’s own desire to
attain the irreversible. But apart from that fact, a more fundamental
question awaits us, the question whether men’s opinions ought to
be expected to be absolutely uniform in this field. Ought all men
to have the same religion? Ought they to approve the same fruits
and follow the same leadings? Are they so like in their inner needs
that, for hard and soft, for proud and humble, for strenuous and
lazy, for healthy-minded and despairing, exactly the same religious
incentives are required? Or are different functions in the organism
of humanity allotted to different types of man, so that some may
really be the better for a religion of consolation and reassurance,
whilst others are better for one of terror and reproof? It might
conceivably be so; and we shall, I think, more and more suspect it
to be so as we go on. And if it be so, how can any possible judge or
critic help being biased in favor of the religion by which his own
needs are best met? He aspires to impartiality; but he is too close to
the struggle not to be to some degree a participant, and he is sure
to approve most warmly those fruits of piety in others which taste
most good and prove most nourishing to him.