Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution
7
•
Similar explicitly pan-Turkic and anti-Persian views have been
propagated by various Iranian Azerbaijani diaspora groups. These
organizations reside outside Iran in Western Europe and North America,
and, to a lesser extent in the Azerbaijani Republic. The latter generally
seeks to distance itself from expressing formal support to Iranian
Azerbaijanis’ struggle and also from the anti-Iranian rhetoric from some
of their representatives based abroad. The influence of these groups in
the midst of diaspora-based Iranian Azerbaijanis remains unclear as does
their impact on the developments within Iran.
•
The official position of Iranian authorities contends that Iranian
Azerbaijani activists, both seeking secession and struggling to acquire
ethno-linguistic rights within Iran’s borders, are orchestrated by Iran’s
outside enemies for the sake of sowing the seed of public unrest to
disintegrate the multi-ethnic republic. Yet, no available evidence points
to the U.S.A, Turkey, Israel, and Azerbaijan being the masterminds of
public protests in Iran’s Azerbaijani provinces, or having cultivated in
Iran’s northwest spy networks, although there is some fractured
evidence to imply that individual policy-makers in the U.S.A in the early
2000s may have had initial interest in assessing the potential of
Azerbaijani separatism in Iran.
•
Notwithstanding, due to these recent developments, many Iranian
Azerbaijanis, particularly socially conservative populations residing in
rural areas, appear to self-identify as Shiite Muslims first, Iranians
second, and Azerbaijanis third. For them, loyalty to the Iranian Shiite
state trumps their ethno-linguistic roots and regional identity. Any form
of public activism for the sake of obtaining cultural rights, not least
secession from the Islamic Republic, is condemned as being inspired by
outside powers (Turkey, Israel, U.S.A) in order to imperil the sacred
unity of their Iranian fatherland.
•
The ongoing civil war in Syria has deepened existing divisions within the
Iranian Azerbaijani population. While urban youths have expressed
sympathies towards Turkey and the West and blamed the Assad regime
and its Russian and Iranian allies for deliberately targeting innocent
Souleimanov & Kraus
8
civilians, rural Iranian Azerbaijanis have shown full support for Iran’s
(and Russia’s) actions in Syria. Indeed, rural Iranian Azerbaijanis have
praised efforts to rescue fellow Shiites – and expand Iran’s influence in a
strategically important country.
•
The emergence of an independent Azerbaijan in 1991 shaped Iran’s South
Caucasian policy for the years to come. Concerned with the negative
impact of the Azerbaijani Republic on its own Azerbaijani minority,
Tehran in the early 1990s was quick to align itself with Russia to prevent
ambitious regional energy projects from realization as they could link up
Azerbaijan to international oil and natural gas markets.
•
The long-term trend of Iranian youth disassociating themselves from the
theocratic regime and its ideology while enduring it outwardly has led
to the return of nationalism within the identity of ethnic Persian. Along
with this nationalism is anti-Arabic and anti-Turkic overtones. This trend
has been running against a similar trend in the midst of young Iranian
Azerbaijanis’ rediscovered interest in their Turkic heritage. In the years
to come, the weakened appeal of shared Shiite religion and increasing
disassociation from the theocratic regime may deepen conflict between
both Persian nationalists and Azerbaijani Turkic nationalists. This
development could pave the way for ethnically-motivated upheavals in
a country that has so far affected the fate of neighboring multi-ethnic
States.
Iran’s relationship with Turkey, U.S.A, Israel, and Russia have to an extent
impacted Iran’s Azerbaijani community – or discussion of its role in Iran’s
relationship with its allies, partners, and foes:
•
In the last two decades, many Iranian Azerbaijanis have deemed Turkish
identity to be increasingly prestigious. This is due to Turkey’s connotation
of a more liberal, modern, militarily powerful, and advanced country. The
reception of Turkish (and Azerbaijani) satellite television, formally banned
in Iran, has played a significant role in advancing Iranian Azerbaijanis’
Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution
9
ethno-linguistic and cultural emancipation. While increasingly rigorous
Turkic identity – and pro-Turkish sentiments – in the midst of Iran’s (urban-
based) Azerbaijani community have since the 1990s been a matter of jealousy
for Persian-speakers, Iranian authorities appear to have cultivated a sense of
Turkey’s covert involvement in Iranian Azerbaijanis’ affairs. Therefore,
explicitly demonstrated pro-Turkish slogans, such as waving Turkish flags
and shouting pro-Turkish mottos by Tractor Sazi fans, have been interpreted
by Iranian authorities as being orchestrated by Turkey through the network
of its agents in Iran’s northwest. The Syrian Civil War has brought additional
tension to Turkish-Iranian relations. While there is a lack of evidence
regarding the involvement of Turkish intelligence in stirring up protests
among Iran’s Azerbaijanis, its presence in Iran’s northwest cannot be ruled
out. Conflicting Turkish and Iranian interests and their increasing regional
rivalry may motivate Turkey to take a greater interest in weakening the
Islamic Republic from within.
•
Washington’s troublesome relationship with Tehran has been associated
with its efforts to weaken the Islamic Republic both externally and internally.
The existence in Iran of a discontented Azerbaijani minority may play well
to Washington’s hand. This could explain efforts by some American
politicians in the early 2000s to investigate the potential for Iranian
Azerbaijanis’ separatism and irredentism. Yet so far, there is no evidence of
direct American interference. The U.S. lacks the capacity to instigate an anti-
Tehran rebellion in Iranian Azerbaijan. Yet, due to the current trend of
strengthening Azerbaijani Turkic nationalism in Iran, the situation may
change in the medium-term.
•
From the early 1990s and onwards, Russia and Iran have shared many
common interests both in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea area. Both
Tehran and Moscow have desired a weak Azerbaijan, preferably without
Western orientation and isolated from important East-West energy projects.
Upheavals in the midst of Iran’s Azerbaijani community, as well as any
internal troubles that would weaken the Islamic Republic, are thus not in
Moscow’s interest. Moscow seeks to have Iran as a strong regional and
global partner.
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