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C H A P T E R O N E
know whether the rules related to a situation can be broadly classed as
government property, private property, community property, or no prop-
erty which is an open-access setting (Bromley et al. 1992). Scholars in the
legal pluralist tradition have strongly criticized these categories as not
being precise enough to understand the incentives facing participants and
thus are inadequate as a foundation for public policy (Benda-Beckmann
2001). They argue that an analyst needs to learn more about particular
property rights that specify particular bundles of rights (such as the right
to enter a state park versus the right to hunt deer in the same park) in
much more detail than those broad categories of rights (Benda-Beckmann
1995, 1997).
A myriad of specific rules are used in structuring complex action arenas.
Scholars have been trapped into endless cataloging of rules not related to
a method of classification most useful for theoretical explanations. But
classification is a necessary step in developing a science. Anyone at-
tempting to define a useful typology of rules must be concerned that the
classification is more than a method for imposing superficial order onto
an extremely large set of seemingly disparate rules. The way we have
tackled this problem using the IAD framework is to classify rules ac-
cording to their direct impact on the working parts of an action situation
(as will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7).
Biophysical and Material Conditions
While a rule configuration affects all of the elements of an action situa-
tion, some of the variables of an action situation (and thus the overall set
of incentives facing individuals in a situation) are also affected by attri-
butes of the biophysical and material world being acted upon or trans-
formed. What actions are physically possible, what outcomes can be pro-
duced, how actions are linked to outcomes, and what is contained in the
actors’ information sets are affected by the world being acted upon in a
situation. The same set of rules may yield entirely different types of action
situations depending upon the types of events in the world being acted
upon by participants. These “events” are frequently referred to by politi-
cal economists as the “goods and services” being produced, consumed,
and allocated in a situation as well as the technology available for these
processes.
The attributes of the biophysical and material conditions and their
transformation are explicitly examined when the analyst self-consciously
asks a series of questions about how the world being acted upon in a
situation affects the outcome, action sets, action-outcome linkages, and
information sets in that situation. The relative importance of the rule con-
figuration and biophysical conditions structuring an action situation var-
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D I V E R S I T Y A N D S T R U C T U R E D I N T E R A C T I O N S
ies dramatically across different types of settings. The rule configuration
almost totally constitutes some games, like chess, where physical attri-
butes are relatively unimportant. The relative importance of working
rules to biophysical attributes also varies dramatically within action situa-
tions considered to be part of the public sector. Rules define and constrain
voting behavior inside a legislature more than attributes of the biophysical
world. Voting can be accomplished by raising hands, by paper ballots, by
calling for the ayes and nays, by marching before an official counter, or
by installing computer terminals for each legislator on which votes are
registered. In regard to communication within a legislature, however, at-
tributes of the biophysical world strongly affect the available options. The
principle that only one person can be heard and understood at a time in
any one forum strongly affects the capacity of legislators to communicate
effectively with one another (see V. Ostrom 1987).
Considerable academic literature has focused on the effect of attributes
of goods on the results obtained within action situations. A key assump-
tion made in the analysis of a competitive market is that the outcomes of
an exchange are highly excludable, easily divisible and transferable, and
internalized by those who participate in the exchange. Markets are pre-
dicted to fail as effective decision mechanisms when they are the only
arena available for producing, consuming, or allocating a wide variety
of goods that do not meet the criteria of excludability, divisibility, and
transferability. Market failure means that the incentives facing individuals
in a situation, where the rules are those of a competitive market but the
goods do not have the characteristics of “private goods,” are insufficient
to motivate individuals to produce, allocate, and consume these goods at
an optimal level.
Let us briefly consider two attributes that are frequently used to distin-
guish among four basic goods and services: exclusion and subtractability
of use. Exclusion relates to the difficulty of restricting those who benefit
from the provision of a good or a service. Subtractability refers to the
extent to which one individual’s use subtracts from the availability of a
good or service for consumption by others. Both of these two attributes
can range from low to high. When these attributes are dichotomized and
arrayed as shown in figure 1.3, they can be used as the defining attributes
of four basic types of goods: toll goods (sometimes referred to as club
goods), private goods, public goods, and common-pool resources. Goods
that are generally considered to be “public goods” yield nonsubtractive
benefits that can be enjoyed jointly by many people who are hard to ex-
clude from obtaining these benefits. Peace is a public good, as my enjoy-
ment of peace does not subtract from the enjoyment of others. Common-
pool resources yield benefits where beneficiaries are hard to exclude but
each person’s use of a resource system subtracts units of that resource