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Are there other or more archetypal pleasures? This pleasure, which is the only pleasure, is at
the same time properly unimaginable. Such is the paradox of the imagination: it alone arouses
or irritates desire but also it alone, and for the same reason, in the same movement, extends
beyond or divides presence. Rousseau would like to separate the awakening to presence from
the operation of imagination; he always presses on toward that impossible limit. For the
awakening of presence projects or rejects us immediately outside of presence where we are
“led . . . by that living interest, foresightful and all-providing [prévoyant et pourvoyant],
which . . . always throws us far from the present, and which does not exist for natural man”
(Dialogues) 34 Function of representation, imagination is also the temporalizing function, the
excess of the present and the economy of what exceeds presence. There is no unique and full
present (but is there presence then?) except in the imagination’s sleep: “The sleeping
imagination does not know at all how to extend its being into two different times” (Emile, p.
69). When it appears, signs, fiduciary values [legal tender and trusts], and letters emerge, and
they are worse than death.
How many merchants lament in Paris over some misfortune in India! . . . There is a healthy,
cheerful, strong, and vigorous man; it does me good to see him. ... A letter comes by post. . . .
[He] falls into a swoon. When he comes to himself he weeps, laments, and groans, he tears his
hair, and his shrieks re-echo through the air. You would say he was in convulsions. Fool, what
harm has this bit of paper done you? What limb has it torn away? . . . We no longer live in our
own place, we live outside it. ‘What does it profit me to live in such fear of death, when all
that makes life worth living remains? (Emile, pp. 67–68) [P. 47]
Rousseau himself articulates this chain of significations (essence, origin, presence, birth,
rebirth) on the classical metaphysics of the entity as energy, encompassing the relationships
between being and time in terms of the now as being in action (energeia) :
Delivered from the disquietude of hope, and sure of thus gradually losing that of desire,
seeing that the past was no longer anything to me, I undertook to put myself completely in the
situation of a man who begins to live. I told myself that in fact we were always beginning,
and that there was no other link in our existence but a succession of present moments of
which the first is always that which is in action. We are bom and die every moment of our life.
It follows—but it is a liaison that Rousseau works very hard to elide—that the very essence of
presence, if it must always be repeated within an-other presence, opens originarily, within
presence itself, the structure of representation. And if essence is presence, there is no essence
of presence nor presence of essence. There is a play of representation and eliding that liai-
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son or that consequence, Rousseau places play out of play: he eludes, which is another way of
playing, or rather, as the dictionaries say, of playing (with). What is thus eluded is the fact that
representation does not suddenly encroach upon presence; it inhabits it as the very condition
of its experience, of desire, and of enjoyment [jouissance]. The intertior doubling of presence,
its halving, makes it appear as such, that is to say, concealing enjoyment in frustration, makes
it disappear as such. Placing representation outside, which means placing the outside outside,
Rousseau would like to make of the supplement of presence a pure and simple addition, a
contingence: thus wishing to elude what, in the interior of presence, calls forth the substitute,
and is constituted only in that appeal, and in its trace.
Thence the letter. Writing is the evil of representative repetition, the double that opens desire
and contemplates and binds [re-garde] enjoyment. Literary writing, the traces of the
Confessions, speak that doubling of presence. Rousseau condemns the evil of writing and
looks for a haven within writing. It repeats enjoyment symbolically. And just as enjoyment
has never been present except in a certain repetition, so writing, recalling enjoyment, gives it
as well. Rousseau eludes its admission but not the pleasure. We re-call those texts (“Saying to
myself I have rejoiced, I rejoice again....” “I rejoice again in a pleasure that no longer is.” . . .
“Incessantly occupied with the thought of my past happiness, I recall it, so to speak, chew the
cud of it to such an extent that, when I desire it, I am able to enjoy it over again”) [p. 607].
Writing represents (in every sense of the word) enjoyment. It plays enjoyment, renders it
present and absent. It is play. And it is be-cause it is also the good fortune of enjoyment
repeated that Rousseau practices it while condemning it: “I shall set down in writing those
[’delightful contemplations’] which may still come to me: each time that I reread them will
give me new pleasure” (Reveries, p. 999) [p. 38].
This entire digression was necessary in order to mark well that, unless some extrinsic desire is
invested in it, Leibniz’s universal characteristic represents the very death of enjoyment. It
leads the representer to the limit of its excess. Phonetic writing, however abstract and
arbitrary, retained some relationship with the presence of the represented voice, to its possible
presence in general and therefore to that of a certain passion. A writing that breaks with the
phonè radically is perhaps the most rational and effective of scientific machines; it no longer
responds to any desire or rather it signifies its death to desire. It was what already operated
within speech as writing and machine. It is the representer in its pure state, without the
represented, or without the order of the represented naturally linked to it. That is why this
pure conventionality ceases, being pure, to be of any use within “civil life,” which always
mingles nature and convention. The perfection of convention here touches its opposite
extreme, it is death and the perfect alienation of the instrument of civil order. The telos of the
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alienation of writing has in Rousseau’s eyes the form of scientific or technical writing,
wherever it can act, that is to say even outside of the areas reserved for “science” or
“technology.” It is not by chance that in mythology, the Egyptian in particular, the god of
sciences and technologies is also the god of writing; and that it is he (Thoth, Theuth, Teuthus
or his Greek homologue Hermes, god of the ruse, of trade, and of thieves) whom Rousseau
incriminates in the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences. (Plato had already denounced his
invention of writing at the end of the Phaedrus.) :
An ancient tradition passed out of Egypt into Greece, that some god, who was an enemy to the
repose of mankind, was the inventor of the sciences.* ... In fact, whether we turn to the annals