Through these notions of self-differentiation and self-postponement, Husserl seems to be
launching the idea of differance: “The originary Differance of the absolute Origin . . . is
perhaps what has always been said through the concept of the ‘
transcendental.’ . . . This
strange procession of a ‘Rückfrage’ [checking back], is the movement sketched in ‘The Origin
of Geometry.’ 53 The idea is perhaps there in Husserl, and if so, it is only sketched. For, as we
shall see later in my discussion of phonocentrism, Husserl surrounds this idea of differance
with a constituting subject, a subject that generates and is therefore the absolute origin of the
structure of difference. To win Husserl’s thought, which unwillingly outlines the structures of
grammatology, into grammatological discourse, a massive rewriting will have to be
undertaken: “This determination of ‘absolute subjectivity’ would . . . have to be crossed out as
soon as we conceive the present
on the basis of differance, and not the reverse. The concept of subjectivity
((11))
belongs a priori and in general to the order of the constituted [rather than ;r the
constituting].... There is no constituting subjectivity. The very concept of constitution itself
must be deconstructed.” (VP 94 n., SP 84–85 n.)
Not only in the field of subjectivity, but also in the field of objective knowledge, Husserl
seems to open as well as deliberately close the possibility of grammatology. If there is an
“indeterminately general presumptive
((lii))
horizon” of the knowable, Husserl places it within the control of an in-finitely synthesising
directedness (intentionality) of the ego, an ego that can be uncovered for the philosopher only
by bracketing, “ ‘putting out of play’ of all positions taken toward the already-given Objective
world.”54 If, almost in spite of himself, Husserl seems to suggest that expression can never be
adequate to the sense which it expresses, he covers himself by giving to the “is” or to the
predicative statement a privilege. Once again, Derrida must undertake a reversal. “It might
then be thought [following Husserl] that the sense of being has been limited by the imposition
of form—which ... would, with the authority of the is, have assigned to the sense of being the
closure of presence, the form-of-presence, presence-in-form, or form-presence.... [or] that
[the] thought of form [pensée de la forme] has the power to extend itself beyond the thought
of being [pensée de l’être]... . Our task is . . . to reflect on the circularity which makes the one
pass into the other indefinitely.” (MP 206-07, SP 127–28)
Freud had found in the mystic writing pad a model that would con-tain the problematics of the
psyche—a virgin surface that still retained permanent traces. Husserl confronted a similar
problem when he posited a “sense” that is anterior to the act of “expression” or “meaning.”
“How could we ever conceive,” Derrida asks, “of the perpetual restoration of meaning in its
virginal state [within the egological history]?” (MP 197, SP 118) Husserl does not stop to
consider the question. He simply “betrays a certain uneasiness ... and attributes the
indecisiveness of his description to the incidentally metaphorical character of language.” (MP
198, SP 119) Again it is Derrida who, through a careful consideration of precisely the
metaphorics of Husserl’s argument, must deliver the conclusion: “We must conclude that
sense in general, the noematic [knowable] sense of every experience, is something which, by
its very nature, must be already able to be impressed on a meaning, to leave or receive its
formal determination in a meaning. Sense would therefore already be a kind of blank and
mute writing which is reduplicated in meaning.” (MP 197, SP 117)
One of Husserl’s most original insights is that speech can be genuine without “knowledge,”
that the relation with the object that “animates the body of the signifier” need not be “known”
by the speaker or hearer , through direct intuition. Derrida, “following the logic and necessity
of these [Husserl’s] distinctions” (VP 102, SP 92), disengages a more radical suggestion :
.... not only [does] meaning . . . . not essentially imply the intuition of the object but ... it
essentially excludes it. . . . My nonperception, my nonintuition, my hic et nunc absence are
said by that very thing that I say, by that which I say and because I say it.... The absence of
intuition—and therefore of the subject of the intuition—is not only tolerated by speech; it is
required by the general structure of signification, when considered
in itself. It is radically
((liii))
requisite: the total absence of the subject and object of a statement—the death of the writer
and/or the disappearance of the object he was able to describe—does not prevent a text from
“meaning” something. On the contrary, this possibility gives birth to meaning as such, gives it
out to be heard and read. (VP 102, 108; SP 92–93)
The structure of alterity (otherness and absence of meaning or self) must be operative within
the sign for it to operate as such. But Husserl cannot fully articulate this trace-structure of
expression, which his text suggests: “The theme of full ‘presence,’ the intuitionistic
imperative [expression must be fulfilled through intuition], and the project of knowledge
continue to command—at a distance, we said—the whole of the description. Husserl
describes, and in one and the same movement effaces, the emancipation of speech as
nonknowing.” (VP 109, SP 97)
The intuitionistic imperative works curiously in the case of the word “I.” Husserl will not
grant it the possibility of being uttered without being known intuitively.
Husserl’s premises should sanction our saying exactly the contrary. Just as I need not perceive
in order to understand a statement about perception, so there is no need to inuit the object I in
order to understand the word I... . Whether or not perception accompanies the statement of
perception, whether or not life as self-presence accompanies the uttering of the I, is quite
indifferent with regard to the functioning of meaning. My death is structurally necessary to
the pronouncing of the I. . . . The anonymity of the written I, the im-propriety [lack of
property] of I write, is, contrary to what Husserl says, the “normal situation.” (VP 107–08, SP
96-97)
Thus Derrida “produces” an ostensibly most anti-Husserlian reading of Husserl: for Husserl,
as we have seen, the voice—not empirical speech but the phenomenological structure of the
voice—is the most immediate evidence of self-presence. In that silent interior monologue,
where no alien material signifier need be introduced, pure self-communication (auto-
affection) is possible. Derrida shows that, if Husserlian theory is followed rigorously, a
procedure Husserl himself seems unwilling to undertake, the structure of speech or voice is
seen to be constituted by the necessary absence of both the object and the subject. It is
constituted, in other words, by the structure of writing: “The autonomy of meaning with
regard to intuitive cognition . . . [that] Husserl established . . . has its norm in writ-ing.” (VP