The goal of Lacanian analysis is to draw out and establish the “truth” of the subject. It is not a
simple question of objectification of a subjective situation. For “no language can speak the
truth about truth, for the grounds of truth are that which it speaks, it cannot found itself in any
other way.” (Ec 867-68) “Language installs the dimension of truth (inconceivable outside of
discourse or what is structured as discourse), even as it excludes all guarantee of this truth.”
Yet, just as, even while establishing the notion of “sous rature,” Heidegger could not
relinquish a nostalgia for undoing forgetfulness, so Lacan’s thought must work in terms of a
reference point that is the primary truth. The passage above continues: “In relation to this
absence of guarantee, a primary affirmation is engendered that is also the primary truth.” (Sc
I. 98) As in Heidegger the answer to the precomprehended question of Being might be read as
a self-sufficient signified of all signifiers, so Lacan’s ineffable primary truth be-comes its own
guarantee. Derrida makes the Heideggerian connections explicit:
Truth—cut off from [or adulterated with, coupée de] knowledge—is constantly determined as
revelation, non-veiling, that is: necessarily as presence, presentation of the present, “Being of
being” (Anwesenheit) or, in a more literally Heideggerian mode, as the unity of veiling and
unveiling. The reference to the results of Heidegger’s progress is often explicit in this form
(“the radical ambiguity indicated by Heidegger to the extent that truth means revelation,” [Ec]
p. 166, “the passion for unveiling which has an object: the truth.” [Ec] p. 193, etc.) (Pos F
117, Pos E II.43)
Freud had given “a metaphysical name” to the radical alterity inhabiting the psyche—the
unconscious. It appears to Derrida that, in spite of giving
((lxiv))
to the unconscious the structure of a language, Lacan has contrived to entrench Freud’s
metaphysical suggestions by making the unconscious the seat of verification and “truth.”
Lacan speaks often and at length about the “veritable subject of the unconscious” (Ec 417)
and of “the truth” of the unconscious as the “cause” of the signifying symptomatology of the
subject. The analyst interprets the distorted énonciation (speech event) of the subject’s
symptom into the true énoncé (narrated event) of the unconscious: “. . . to the extent that it
[the subject] speaks, it is in the place of the Other that it begins to constitute that truthful lie
[mensonge veridique] by way of which what partakes of desire on the level of the
unconscious gets itself going.”76
“Le mensonge veridique.” This, Derrida feels, is too clearly Lacan’s attitude toward fiction.
Whereas Derrida sees “truth” (if one can risk that word) as being constituted by “fiction” (if
one can risk that word), Lacan seems to use fiction as a clue to truth. There is a fairly detailed
discussion of this in Derrida’s “Le facteur de la vérité”: “Once one had distinguished, as does
the entire philosophical tradition, between truth and reality, it goes without saying that truth
‘establishes itself in the structure of a fiction.’ Lacan strongly insists upon the opposition
truth/reality which he advances as a paradox. This opposition, as orthodox as possible,
facilitates the pas-sage of truth through fiction: common sense will always have made the
division between reality and fiction.” (FV 128) Here again, Lacan seems to Derrida to have
carried forward Freud’s less adventurous side—the side that solves puzzles—at the expense of
the Freud who opens up the grammatology of the psyche. Lacan’s misreading of the quotation
from Crébillon at the end of Poe’s “The Purloined Letter”—he substitutes “destin” (destiny)
for the more problematic “dessein” (design)—is perhaps paradigmatic of this attitude.
Derrida’s second point of disagreement with Lacan relates to the “transcendental signifier.” In
a note on page 32 (page 324) of the Grammatology Derrida cautions us that, when we teach
ourselves to reject the notion of the primacy of the signified—of meaning over word—we
should not satisfy our longing for transcendence by giving primacy to the signifier—word
over meaning. And, Derrida feels that Lacan might have perpetrated precisely this.
The signifiers in Lacan are the symbols that relate the subject through the structure of desire
to the unconscious. “So runs the signifier’s answer [to the subject], above and beyond all
significations: ‘You think you act when I stir you at the mercy of the bonds through which I
knot your desires. Thus do they grow and multiply in objects, bringing you back to the
fragmentation of your shattered childhood.” (Ec 40, FF 71–72) “You will grasp why the
relationship of the subject to the signifier is the reference that we would place in the
foreground of a general rectification
((lxv))
of analytic theory, because it is as primary and constituting in the setting up of the analytical
experience, as it is primary and constituting in the radical function of the unconscious.” 77 It
has “priority in relation to the signified.” (Ec 29, FF 59) And “the signifier alone guarantees
the theoretical coherence of the entirety [ensemble] [of the subject] as an entirety.” (Ec 414)
Each signifier in the subject is singular and indivisible. In this it shares, Derrida suggests, the
uniqueness and unassailable presence traditionally accorded to the “idea.” For the hallmark of
a philosophically intelligible idea is that it can be infinitely repeated as the “same” idea: it is
singular and indivisible. (FV 121, 126) To repeat our catechism: for Derrida, by contrast to all
this, the signifier and signified are interchange-able; one is the differance of the other; the
concept of the sign itself is no more than a legible ÿ et effaced, unavoidable tool. Repetition
leads to a simulacrum, not to the “same.”
Lacan’s radical description of the function of the signifier combines presence and absence.
“For the signifier is a unit in its very uniqueness, being by nature symbol only of an absence.”
(Ec 24, FF 29) It signifies a desire for some thing that the subject has not, the other of the
subject. And the master signifier of these signifiers of desire is the phallus, reflecting the
powerful human passions, the fear of castration (of the mother) in the male and the envy of
the penis in the female. This is not the phallus as an actual organ, penis or clitoris. It is the
phallus as a signifier, that can come to take the place of all signifiers signifying all desires for
all absences. “Its most profound relation: that by which the Ancients incarnated the Nous and
the Logos.” (Ec 695) “The phallus is a signifier, a signifier whose function . . . perhaps lifts
the veil from that which it held in the mysteries. For it is the signifier destined to design in
their entirety the effects of the signified, to the extent that the signifier conditions them by its
signifier-presence [présence de signifiant].” (Ec 690) The position of the phallus on the chain
of signifiers to which it belongs even as it makes it possible” (FV 132) is, strictly speaking,
transcendental. Heidegger’s Being, even under erasure, could be a transcendental signified.
Lacan’s phallus, signify-ing an absence, is a transcendental signifier.
Within this sexual fable of the production of meaning, Derrida’s term is dissemination.
Exploiting a false etymological kinship between semantics and semen, Derrida offers this
version of textuality: A sowing that does not produce plants, but is simply infinitely repeated.
A semination that is not insemination but disseminaton, seed spilled in vain, an emission that
can-not return to its origin in the father. Not an exact and controlled polysemy, but a
proliferation of always different, always postponed meanings. Speak-ing of the purloined