24 / Croce /
The Essence of Aesthetic
him to judge. In this case the critic appears as a cultivated
cicerone or as a patient and discreet schoolmaster:
“Criticism is the art of teaching to read,” is the definition
of a famous critic; and the definition has not been without
its echo. Now no one contests the utility of guides to
museums or exhibitions, or of teachers of reading, still
less of learned guides and masters who know so many
things hidden from the majority and are able to throw so
much light on subjects. Not only has the art that is most
remote from us need of this assistance, but also that of the
nearest past, called contemporary, which, although it
treats of subjects and presents forms that seem to be
obvious, yet is not always sufficiently obvious; and
sometimes a considerable effort is required to prepare
people to feel the beauty of a little poem or of some work
of art, though born but yesterday. Prejudices, habits and
forgetfulness form hedges barring the approach to that
work: the expert hand of the interpreter and commentator
is required to remove them. Criticism in this sense is
certainly most useful, but we do not see why it should be
called criticism, when that sort of work already possesses
its own name of interpretation, comment or exegesis. It
would be better not to call it so, for this is apt to lead to
tiresome misunderstanding.
Misunderstanding, because criticism seems to be, wishes
to be and is something different: it does not wish to
invade art, nor to rediscover the beauty of the beautiful, or
the ugliness of the ugly, nor to make itself small before
art, but rather to make itself great before art which is great
and, in a certain sense, above it.
2
What, then, is legitimate
and true criticism?
First of all, it is at once all the three things that I have
hitherto explained; that is to say, all these three things are
its necessary conditions, without which it would not arise.
Without the moment of art (and, as we have seen, that
criticism which affirms itself to be productive or an aid to
production, or as repressing certain forms of production to
the advantage of certain other forms, is, in a certain sense,
art against art), the material on which to exercise itself
would be wanting to criticism. Without taste (judicial
criticism) the experience of art would be wanting to the
critic, that of art creating itself within his spirit, severed
from non-art and enjoyed in opposition to it. And finally,
this experience would be wanting without exegesis,
without the removal of the obstacles to reproductive
imagination, which supplies the spirit with those
presuppositions of historical knowledge of which it has
need, and which are the wood to burn in the fire of
imagination.
2
It is a proud moment, both for critic and poet, when both can
exclaim in the words of Archimedes: “Eureka.” The poet finds
the region where his genius can henceforth live and expand; the
critic finds the base and the law of that genius. (Sainte-Beuve,
Portraits littéraires, I, 31.)
But before going further, it will be well to resolve here a
grave doubt which has been agitated and is still agitated,
both in philosophical literature and in ordinary thought,
and which certainly, were it justified, would not only
compromise the possibility of criticism, of which we are
talking, but also of reproductive imagination itself or
taste. Is it truly possible to collect, as does exegesis, the
materials required for reproducing the work of art of
others (or our own past work of art, when we search our
memory and consult our papers in order to remember
what we were when we produced it), and to reproduce
that work of art in our imagination in its genuine features?
Can the collection of the material required be ever
complete? And however complete it be, will the
imagination ever permit itself to be enchained by it in its
labour of reproduction? Will it not act as new
imagination, introducing new material? Will it not be
obliged to do so, owing to its impotence truly to
reproduce the other and the past? Is the reproduction of
the individual, of the individuum ineffabile, conceivable,
when every sane philosophy teaches that the universal
alone is eternally reproducible? Will not the reproduction
of the works of art of others or of the past be in
consequence a simple impossibility; and will not what is
usually alleged as an undisputed fact in ordinary
conversation, and is the expressed or implied
presupposition in every dispute upon art, be perhaps (as
was said of history in general) une fable convenue?
Certainly, when we consider the problem rather from
without, it will seem most improbable that the firm belief
which all possess in the comprehension and
understanding of art is without foundation, — all the more
so, if we observe that those very people who deny the
possibility of reproductions in abstract theory — or, as
they call it, the absoluteness of taste — are yet most
tenacious in maintaining their own judgments of taste,
and very clearly realise the difference there is between the
affirmation that wine pleases or displeases me because it
agrees or disagrees with my physiological organism, and
the affirmation that one poem is beautiful and another
ugly: the second order of judgments (as Kant shows in a
classical analysis) carries with it the invincible claim to
universal validity; men become passionate about it, and in
days of chivalry there were even those who maintained
the beauty of the Gerusalemme, sword in hand, whereas
no one that we know of has ever been killed maintaining
sword in hand that wine was pleasant or unpleasant. To
object that works most artistically base have yet pleased
some or many, and at any rate their author, is not valid,
because their having pleased is not set in doubt (since
nothing can be born in the soul without the consent of the
soul, and consequently without corresponding pleasure);
but we question that pleasure being aesthetic and having
as its foundation a judgment of taste and beauty. And
passing from external scepticism to internal consideration,
it should be said that the objection to the conceivability of
the aesthetic reproduction is founded upon a reality