xxviii
INTRODUCTION: SECTION ONE
Berkeley and then Johns Hopkins. He was also a man who had
studied under Wundt and Fechner in Leipzig. Royce presented
himself as James’s replacement that sabbatical year, and with James’s
help, managed to stay on as the stone against which James sharpened
his philosophical sword of pragmatism for the remainder of their
two careers. Royce would transform himself from an apologist for
Christian monism into a philosopher of science interested in ethics,
loyalty, and idealism, as well as symbolic logic and the logic and
philosophy of science. He would become a steward of the then still
uncollected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce and create a seminar
that would attract an elite of Harvard’s younger generation who
would after his death in 1916 became some of the key powerbrokers
in the University.
33
More than that, Royce became the beloved
friend of William James, and his constant analysis of the pragmatic
ideal in a Christian spiritual context helped make a more mature
philosopher out of his mutually beloved colleague. Royce’s pres-
ence also permitted James to range far and wide beyond the purely
Christian scheme of salvation alone in order to look for the generic
roots of spiritual experience across cultures.
34
William James, himself, finally came out with his textbook, The
Principles of Psychology, but twelve years late. Instead of the slim and
efficient volume he had forecast, it came to over 1,200 pages in two
volumes. Exhausted, he said he was finally glad to get that “dropsical
tumescent mass” off his desk. The work received international
acclaim and two years later he produced the cut-and-paste version,
Psychology: Briefer course, which became one of the most used intro-
ductory textbooks in psychology over the next twenty years.
35
His students dubbed The Principles “The James” and Briefer course,
“the Jimmy.” Both works had a common theme focused almost
entirely on a psychology of the individual, what goes on inside
people’s inner lives, their feelings, sensation, cognitions and percep-
tions; the working of the individual will, the relation of the instincts
33
Costello, Harry Todd, Josiah Royce’s seminar, 1913–1914: As recorded in the notebooks
Harry T. Costello. Edited by Grover Smith, with an essay on the philosophy of Royce by
Richard Hocking. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981.
34
Taves, A, Fits, Trances, and Visions: Experiencing Religion and Explaining Experience from
Wesley to James. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.
35
James, W. Principles of psychology, 2 vols. New York: Henry Holt, 1890; James, W.
Psychology: Briefer course. New York: Henry Holt, 1892.
INTRODUCTION: SECTION ONE
xxix
to the emotions, and what kind of a self individuals become in light
of James’s claim that each of us is comprised of many selves. He
would later articulate this focus on the individual as his doctrine of
pluralism, acknowledging that there is very little difference between
people, “but what difference there is,” he said, “was very important.”
The problem with The Principles, however, was that it had two
centers of gravity — a scientific and a philosophical one. From
the standpoint of science, James wrote from the perspective of
reductionistic positivism. He did this, he said, because there was no
epistemological system yet developed that was powerful enough to
challenge it. From the standpoint of philosophy, he left open the
possibility that an alternative epistemology might be found to the
way science was conducted. Pragmatism demanded, after all, that two
different approaches leading to the same ends were for all intents and
purposes equal, even if not the same. So, in addition to the central
theme of the work, that the thinker is the thought, and nothing
more need be posited of a scientific psychology, James engaged in
numerous forays into dissociation, multiple personality, and alterna-
tive states of consciousness. It was a definition of consciousness
that deviated significantly from the normative psychologists’ almost
exclusive focus on simple reaction times, knee jerk reflexes, and the
object at the cognitive center of the field of attention, and it was
destined to become James’s central focus after 1890.
36
Four years later, in his presidential address to the American
Psychological Association, James reminded his audience of the
epistemological conundrum he had presented in The Principles. But
he shocked them there by saying that, rather than take up the old
arguments, he was going to throw them over, and instead, argue for
a new epistemology for experimental science. It took him two more
years to give it a name, when it appeared for the first time in his
first philosophical work, The Will to Believe.
37
There in the preface,
he called it radical empiricism, by which he meant a radical trans-
formation of the reductionistic outlook in psychology and science
generally by shifting to a focus on pure experience in the immedi-
ate moment.
36
Taylor, E. I., William James on Consciousness beyond the Margin. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1996.
37
James, W., The will to believe. New York: Longman’s, Green, 1896.