R E S E A R C H
I I A S N E W S L E T T E R # 4 7 S p r i n g 0 0 8
This article first appeared in Inside
Indonesia. No. 92, April-June 2008.
www.insideindonesia.org and was
prepared for the conference:
Indonesia ten years after (1998-
2008), held on 22-23 May 2008 at
the Oost Indisch Huis, University of
Amsterdam.
Marcus Mietzner
Since the late 1950s, two authoritarian
regimes (first Sukarno’s Guided Democra-
cy, then Suharto’s New Order) had tightly
controlled and regulated the existence and
activities of political parties in Indonesia.
Under Suharto, the number of parties had
been reduced to three, with the govern-
ment’s electoral machine Golkar ensured
of regular triumphs at the ballot box. By
contrast, the post-1998 party system has
witnessed almost no institutional restric-
tions or government interference. Except
for a continuing ban on communist-lean-
ing platforms, parties are largely free to
choose their ideological orientation and
organisational structure. In addition, all
post-Suharto elections (two parliamen-
tary polls and two rounds of a presidential
ballot) have been widely acknowledged as
free and fair. In this liberal climate, parties
of all colours and convictions have mush-
roomed, with 17 of them holding seats in
the current parliament and another 95 reg-
istered at the Department of Justice and
Human Rights.
Yet, ten years after Suharto’s fall, Indone-
sian political parties are the target of fierce
criticism by observers, civil society leaders
and the general public. Opinion surveys
show that Indonesians view the parties as
corrupt, unresponsive, self-absorbed and
ineffective. Newspaper columns regularly
launch stinging attacks on party leaders,
and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) have focused many of their pro-
grammes on scrutinising the activities of
political parties – or the lack thereof. At
the same time, however, the party system
seems surprisingly stable. Despite the con-
stant outpouring of criticism, there have
been very few calls for the disbandment of
the party-based democratic system, and
parties continue to receive large numbers
of new members.
What are the reasons for this seemingly
paradoxical situation? How to explain
this love-hate relationship between Indo-
nesians and their political parties? This
article discusses the reasons for the insti-
tutional solidity of the Indonesian party
system, but also explores why this signifi-
cant success has not been accompanied
by higher levels of public support among
ordinary Indonesians for the parties. After
evaluating structural, political and ideolog-
ical issues involving the state of Indone-
sia’s party system, I conclude that, despite
ongoing problems, Indonesia’s parties
deserve more credit for their contribution
to the strength of the democratic polity
than is usually extended to them.
Stable
The first significant feature of Indonesia’s
post-Suharto parties is their relative sta-
bility and continuity. All large parties that
contested the 1999 elections still exist a
decade later. They are: the secular-nation-
alist PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party
of Struggle), the former government party
Golkar, the traditionalist Muslim party
PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National
Awakening Party), the Islamic PPP (Partai
Persatuan Pembangunan, United Develop-
ment Party), the modernist Muslim party
PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, National
Mandate Party), the PKS (Prosperous Jus-
tice Party) - a puritan Islamic party that
participated in the 1999 polls as PK (Par-
tai Keadilan, Justice Party), and the ultra-
modernist Islamic party Partai Bulan Bin-
tang (Moon and Crescent Party). There has
been only one noteworthy addition to this
club of major parties in the last ten years:
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s
Democratic Party (PD, Partai Demokrat),
founded in 2001.
This stability of the party system is an unu-
sual phenomenon among Asia’s emerg-
ing democracies. Even in more estab-
lished democratic systems, the lifespan
of political parties is often much shorter.
For instance, the average life expectancy
of political parties in South Korea is three
years, while parties in Thailand and the
Philippines survive only a little longer. In
Indonesia, by contrast, three of the big-
gest parties were founded in the 1960s
and 1970s, with the rest established after
Suharto’s fall. Ten years into the post-
authoritarian era, there are no signs that
any of the larger parties will collapse any-
time soon.
“The stability of the
party system is an
unusual phenomenon
among Asia’s emerging
democracies”
The relative longevity of Indonesian par-
ties is due to a mixture of politico-ideologi-
cal and structural reasons. To begin with,
most Indonesian parties are still rooted
in distinct social, religious or ideological
milieus, and the majority of voters feel
reluctant to move between those constit-
uencies. This entrenchment of paradig-
matic divisions in Indonesian society has
obstructed the internal modernisation of
the mainstream parties, but has also been
responsible for their institutional persist-
ence. Furthermore, Indonesian law forces
parties to establish a nationwide structure
down to the sub-district level, strengthen-
ing their organisational roots and making
it difficult for newcomers to challenge the
already established parties.
The stability of the national party system
is also reflected in the continuously high
voter turn-out. In 1999 and 2004, par-
ticipation in national elections ranged
between 75 and 93 percent, a rate that
even consolidated democracies would
consider healthy. Even in direct elections
for local government heads, in which the
role of the parties is weaker, an average of
69 percent of registered voters took part in
the ballots. While these figures are not an
endorsement of the party system as such,
they indicate that Indonesians deem it
important to express support for the party
of their choice.
Another factor in the resilience of Indone-
sian party politics is the almost complete
absence of extremist parties that reject the
current democratic system. In contrast to
the 1950s, when most parties wanted to
remove or substantially alter parliamen-
tary democracy (and replace it with either
a communist regime, an Islamic state or
authoritarian rule), the parties of the post-
Suharto era have been strongly supportive
of the democratic system. Even the more
formalist Muslim parties have suspended
their campaign for the introduction of
syariat, or Islamic law, after their proposal
for a constitutional amendment was voted
down by an overwhelming majority in
2002. Since then, their politico-ideological
orientation has been largely moderate and
centripetal, further consolidating the core
of the post-authoritarian polity.
Criticism
Despite these positive indicators for a
healthy and functioning party system,
Indonesians have not held back with their
criticism of the parties and their leaders. In
opinion polls, political parties have invari-
ably ranked among the institutions consid-
ered most corrupt, ineffective and unre-
sponsive, and academic observers have
echoed this sentiment with their critiques
in seminars, newspapers and booklets.
The disappointment of ordinary Indo-
nesians with their parties is reflected in
stunning and unambiguous statistics:
more than 1,000 local legislators, almost
ten percent of the total number of parlia-
mentarians across Indonesia, have been
investigated for corruption since 2004.
At the same time, more than 75 percent of
Indonesians do not feel a strong sense of
emotional attachment to any of the exist-
ing parties. In local elections, voters have
mostly opted for independent figures with
only superficial ties to their nominating
parties. In Aceh – the only province where
non-party candidates have thus far been
allowed to stand – nominees put forward
by established parties suffered a series of
crushing defeats.
To be sure, post-Suharto party politics
have drawn a large number of rent-seek-
ers, power brokers and opportunists into
the centre of Indonesia’s new democracy.
This is hardly surprising, given that the
political parties today hold much more
power than at any other time since the
1950s. Through their parliamentarians,
the parties have authority over legislation,
and through their participation in govern-
ment, they dominate the executive as well.
These extensive powers are too tempting
for political and oligarchic operators to
ignore.
“The vicious cycle of
political corruption has
been aggravated by the
populist attitudes in
Indonesian society and
some circles of the NGO
scene”.
However, the problems of Indonesian party
politics are not only about the failing mor-
als of politicians. Structural deficiencies
and unrealistic societal expectations also
play a role. Most importantly, Indonesia
has no coherent system of party financ-
ing in place. The vast majority of party
members pay no membership fees; the
small state subsidies to parties were cut by
almost 90 percent in 2005; and contribu-
tions to parties by entrepreneurs are typi-
cally slammed by the media and civil soci-
ety groups. Accordingly, party boards force
their representatives in legislative and
executive institutions to come up with the
money needed to run an efficient organisa-
tion. Squeezed by their parties, parliamen-
tarians subsequently turn to corruption
and rent-seeking to raise fresh funds.
This vicious cycle of political corruption
has been aggravated by the populist atti-
tudes in Indonesian society and some
circles of the NGO scene. In recent years,
it has become a cherished habit for politi-
cal commentators to decry every attempt
by political parties to obtain monetary or
institutional resources from the state. In
2007, even the planned acquisition of fax
machines and laptops for members of the
national parliament created a huge uproar.
Similarly, it took ten years of post-Suharto
reforms for legislators to be allocated a
single research assistant each. While such
anti-party critics can be certain of thunder-
ous applause from the public, they have
rarely come forward with alternative con-
cepts for proper and transparent funding
mechanisms for Indonesia’s parties.
Ultimately, the problem of corruption in
Indonesian political parties can’t be solved
without ground-breaking reforms of the
party financing system. It would be naïve
to believe that parties can simultaneously
engage in fund-raising activities, stay away
from corrupt practices and be effective
vehicles of political representation and
aggregation. In the absence of member-
ship contributions and public funding,
Indonesia’s parties have so far been forced
to concentrate on raising money instead
of carrying out their functional duties.
Indonesian observers and the general
public should acknowledge this issue as
an institutional defect. In addition, they
should recognise that for all their faults,
the parties have played a significant role in
stabilising the post-authoritarian polity. As
Indonesia approaches the 2009 elections,
the party system appears reasonably solid,
and the introduction of a parliamentary
threshold of 2.5 percent for the upcoming
polls is likely to make it even more com-
pact and cohesive. Given the vulnerabil-
ity and ineffectiveness of party systems
in other emerging democracies, this is
more than Indonesians could have hoped
for when they began their journey into an
uncertain transition ten years ago.
Marcus Mietzner
is a Visiting Research Fellow at KITLV in
Leiden.
He is currently writing a book on political
parties in Indonesia.
(mamietzner@yahoo.com)
One of the most important reforms of the post-Suharto period has been the creation of a highly dynamic and competitive
party system - particularly remarkable given an absence of democratic party politics in Indonesia for more than 40 years.
Yet despite positive indicators for a healthy and functioning party system, Indonesians are highly critical of the parties
and their leaders; and opinion polls rank political parties among the institutions considered most corrupt, ineffective and
unresponsive. Marcus Mietzner examines whether this criticism is justified.
Stable but unpopular:
political parties after Suharto
Many Muslim parties in Indo-
nesia suspended their cam-
paign for Sharia law following
the failure to pass a constitu-
tional amendement in 2002.